Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium by Fox, Eleanor M.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 66
Issue 6 August 1981 Article 3
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium
Eleanor M. Fox
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eleanor M. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140 (1981)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol66/iss6/3
THE MODERNIZATION OF ANTITRUST:
A NEW EQUILIBRIUM
Eleanor M. Foxt
Antitrust law is in search of a new equilibrium. It is torn between
claims that it should limit the power of large corporations and claims
that it should increase the efficiency of American business. Regard for
efficiency is in the ascendancy.
This Article examines the contention that the antitrust laws
should be applied solely to promote efficiency and examines the often
unarticulated definitions of efficiency. It addresses two questions: (1)
How should efficiency, as it informs antitrust, be defined? and (2)
What is the appropriate role of efficiency in antitrust policy and
problem-solving?
The Article concludes that efficiency defined in terms of serving
consumers' long-run interests and implemented by protecting the
competition process is and should continue to be a major goal of
antitrust, and that the basic socio-political values of antitrust other
than smallness for its own sake coincide with efficiency as so conceived
and should continue to guide antitrust policy. The Article proposes a
formulation for achieving a new equilibrium designed to advance the
efficiency goals and harmonize the non-efficiency goals.
I
ANTITRUST AND EFFICIENCY IN CONTEXT
Three quite different questions bear on antitrust and efficiency.
First, what factors and policies are instrumental in producing efficient
performance of American business, and where does antitrust stand
among these factors and policies? Second, what can and should be the
relationship between antitrust law and efficiency? Finally, how effi-
cient is antitrust enforcement, given stated policy goals?
This Article addresses the second question. It does not examine
the efficiency of enforcement as such, but internalizes the premise that
stability and continuity in the antitrust rule of law provides for greater
]Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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certainty and therefore more effective deterrence, lower costs of litiga-
tion, and lower costs in business decisionmaking.
Although the Article is not concerned centrally with examining
the factors and policies that produce efficient performances, that in-
quiry must be made in order to understand the place of antitrust in
the business/performance universe. Antitrust law and enforcement is
not the prime ingredient of the efficient performance of firms. Anti-
trust cannot compel business managers to make progressive decisions
or to take the route that serves consumers best. Rather, antitrust law
plays a role at two other points in the business/performance universe.
First, the law may constrain firms from gaining or abusing market
power, thereby conducing to greater responsiveness to consumers'
wants. Second, antitrust may provide an environment that nurtures a
system of checks, balances, and incentives, causing firms to compete
to provide new, better, and lower cost means of satisfying consumers.
If the purpose of antitrust were solely to improve the performance
of existing business firms in measurable ways, and if the antitrust laws
were to be applied only to achieve provable efficiency gains, then
antitrust law would require a searching reexamination and major
overhaul, perhaps 'even repeal. It is a burden of this Article that the
antitrust laws never had such a narrow mission or such a weighty
charge.
II
THE FORGING OF THE LINK BETWEEN
ANTITRUST AND EFFICIENCY
Antitrust emerged from the 1960s as a philosophy and body of
law reflecting American political democracy.1 It favored dispersion
I See Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1980). See also Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for Legislation, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 867 (1979); Flynn, Introduction, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic,
Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977); Fox, Antitrust,
Mergers, and the Supreme Court: The Politics of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 26 MERCER L. REv. 389
(1975); L. Schwartz, On the Uses of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Treatises, 128 U. PA. L.
REv. 244 (1979); L. Schwartz, "'Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 1076 (1979); L. Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of
Bigness, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 4 (1960).
The Supreme Court summed up the interrelated political and economic values of antitrust
legislation in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958):
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
1981] 1141
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of economic power 2 and easing of access to markets. Faced with the
choice between promoting cost-savings of firms with economic power
and protecting freedom and opportunity of firms without economic
power, the Supreme Court declared that the law favored the latter. 4
By attempting to preserve the competition system as a process, it
sought to protect both business opportunity and the consumer. 5
In general, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court envisioned
sacrificing any one goal of antitrust for fuller realization of any other.
The members of Congress and the members of the Court who spoke
on the point generally assumed that the goals of antitrust were com-
plementary.6 In several decisions, however, the Supreme Court an-
nounced that it must honor the Congressional preference for decen-
tralization of economic power, even if the law so applied occasionally
would impose higher costs.7
If there ever existed an antitrust policy to protect a society of
small business units in spite of possible costs to the consumer, that
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) ("Like the
Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose of the 1950 Celler-Ke-
fauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by keeping a large
number of small competitors in business." (footnote omitted)).
' See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
- Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1958); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1945).
6 See note 5 supra. See also J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 28 (1954); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
ch. IV, at 134-265 (1955); Fox, Economic Concentration, Efficiencies and Competition: Social Goals and
Political Choices, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM 142 (E. Fox & J.
Halverson eds. 1979).
' E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 n.7 (1966) (Black, J.)
(" 'Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an
organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.' "
(quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (L.
Hand, J.))); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC. 312
U.S. 457, 467 (1941) (Black, J.) ("[A] monopoly contrary to [the] policies [of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts] can exist even though a combination may temporarily or even permanently
reduce the price of the articles manufactured or sold.").
Despite Supreme Court statements that antitrust enforcement may be appropriate even
though it may impose costs on consumers, it is not clear that antitrust enforcement has in fact
imposed costs on consumers. Statements from the cases cited above may be read as opposing a
method of analysis that would require extensive cost-benefit calculations, while at the same
1142
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policy has changed.' A new mood emerged in the nation in the late
1970s.9 Influenced by rapidly accelerating inflation, lower productiv-
ity, an increasingly negative balance of payments, and dramatic ad-
vances by Japanese and German producers in world markets, the
current national mood reflects a growing concern for productive effi-
ciency.' 0
Meanwhile, antitrust has become both target and scapegoat.
Critics condemn decisions as frustrating the achievement of effi-
ciency." They denounce the antitrust philosophy of the 1960s as
populist' 2 and protective of inefficient business. 13  They have been
time supporting a process of competition that will probably benefit consumers over the long
run.
8 A shift in the course of antitrust followed changes in the composition of the Supreme
Court. Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Harlan and Fortas, and later Justice Douglas,
retired. President Nixon appointed Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, William H.
Rehnquist, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens. Zion, A
Decade of Constitutional Revision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, col. 2. See
Bock, Antitrust and the Supreme Court-An Economic Exploration, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, Info.
Bull. No. 73 (1980).
ChiefJustice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas were particularly prominent in their
articulation of power-dispersion as the primary goal of antitrust. Chief Justice Warren wrote
the opinion of the Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), a merger
case, which emphasizes the goal of deconcentration in spite of possible costs. Justice Black's
opinions stress freedom, opportunity, and incentives for small business. See, e.g., Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
Justice Douglas's opinions stress individualism and the need of human beings to control their
own lives: "A nation of clerks is anathema to the American antitrust dream." United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting).
9 See, e.g., Millstein, Commission's Section 2 Reform Inappropriate Without More Study, Nat'l
L.J., Mar. 5, 1979, at 22, col. 1; Sims, Antitrust Law is No Business Equal Opportunity Act, Legal
Times of Washington, Mar. 10, 1980, at 11, col. 1. See also Taber, Capitalism: Is It Working
... ?, TIME, Apr. 21, 1980, at 40; SILK, The Slowdown in Productivity, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30,
1980, at D2, col. 1; Farnsworth, Trade Combine Wins Support, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1980, at D2,
col. 1.
10 See note 9 supra. See also Weil, Kiers, Putting Steel into America's Shares of World Markets
(separate articles under one title), N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1979, at A31, cols. 2, 5. Cf Silk,
Interest Groups and Stagflation, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1980, at D2, col. 1 (citing Professor Mancur
Olson's thesis that business organizations tend to accumulate inefficiencies through demands
imposed by labor unions and corporations on the economy, and their thesis that wartime
destruction of the power of private organizations in West Germany and Japan broke the
rigidities in those countries and opened the way to economic efficiency and growth). See also D.
BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 212-15 (1978).
11 L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY, ch. 6, at 145-53 (1980); Thurow, Let's Abolish the
Antitrust Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, at F2, col. 3.
12 A populist was, in historical terms, a member of the People's Party, which was formed in
1891 (the year after the Sherman Act was passed). The People's Party advocated, among other
things, free coinage of silver, public ownership of railroads, and limitations on land ownership.
The populists distrusted bigness and power elites-big business and big government. They
supported reforms designed to increase the power and improve the lot of the plain people. G.
McKENNA, AMERICAN POPULISM xi-xxv, ch. II, at 85-151 (1974). The Farmer's Alliance, a
forebear of the People's Party, flourished at the time of the passage of the Sherman Act. Id. It
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did not advocate competition. Rather, it advocated government regulation in the form of
controlling price and terms of entry. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,
23 U. CHI. L. Rav. 221, 232-33 (1956). The term "Populist" is frequently used today with a
negative connotation to mean one who wants to atomize big business. See I P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 22 (1976).
Those who denounce certain antitrust principles as populist set up a straw man. There is
,no discernible sentiment for pulverization of business. See Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly,
14 U. CHI. L. REv. 153 (1947). See generally the articles and essays collected in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM, supra note 6.
Similarly, there is no discernible academic or public opinion in favor of using antitrust as a
tool to redistribute wealth, other than to give consumers the benefit of a price near cost.
Certain historical goals were distributive in the sense that the Congress that passed the
Sherman Act was concerned that the trusts were profiteering at the expense of the ordinary
person. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text infra. The legislators who spoke to the issue of
wealth transfer expressed the view that the profiteering monopolist does not deserve monopoly
gains. Id.; The Sherman Act Debates, 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman);
id. at 2614 (remarks of Sen. Cooke); id. at 4098 (remarks of Sen. Wilson). See Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). Although the
treble damage action for an overcharge resulting from price-fixing has a distributive effect in
favor of consumers, the Sherman Act cannot fairly be characterized as a tool to make poorer
people richer.
Other distributive effects may be implied from the Clayton Act as originally passed in
1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-26 (1976), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a) (1980) (§ 7 of Clayton Act)) and the 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Amendment to the Clayton Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 18, 21 (1976), as amended supra). These statutes reflect an attempt to provide greater
economic opportunity for entrepreneurs and businesses without market power. 51 CONG. REC.
9088 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell); id. at 14326 (remarks of Sen. Chilton); 96 CONC. REC.
16452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver); id. at 16503-04 (remarks of Sen. Aiken); 95 CONG.
REC. 11506 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Bennett). See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949);
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Owners of businesses
without market power are not necessarily poor, however, and owners of businesses with market
power are not necessarily rich. Therefore, judicial implementation of the above legislative goals
does not necessarily redistribute wealth from the richer to the poorer. Judicial implementation
would tend to distribute business opportunities, and thus incentives, in favor of firms without
market power. Thus, antitrust is a redistributor of wealth in only a modest sense.
13 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976);
Millstein, supra note 9; Sims, supra note 9.
The "new" criticism of antitrust is, in fact, not new. See, e.g., J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, supra
note 6. In chapter I, entitled The New Criticism of Antitrust, the authors, nearly 30 years ago,
summarized the complaints "of business, especially big business," against antitrust:
1. Because the statutes are unclear or have been interpreted unpredictably, no
businessman, however conscientious, is immune from prosecution.
2. Consequently, cases are selected mainly on a political basis.
3. Enforcement ... has been by officials hostile to a free competitive system,
and it has been carried out in a manner that makes vigorous competition more
instead of less difficult for businessmen.
4. The antitrust laws have been interpreted in such a way as to protect small
businesses from deserved competitive extinction; i.e., present interpretations con-
fuse the preservation of competition with the preservation of competitors.
5. The government is attempting to substitute itself for the market in deter-
mining whether small or big business should do a particular job; the only appropri-
ate judge is the consumer.
6. Businessmen should not be urged to compete, only to be turned against
when they win out in the competitive struggle.
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urging upon the courts an efficiency-based antitrust and have won
some favor. 14  Proponents of one currently popular formula for the
solution of all antitrust problems would examine challenged behavior
to determine whether it is primarily output-restricting and therefore
inconsistent with short-run aggregate consumer welfare as deduced
from neo-classical price theory.' 5 If so, the business activity would be
condemned. If not, it would be encouraged.' 6  This conception of
antitrust would prohibit almost nothing at all. "Carried to its full
logical rigor, as it has been by the Chicago School of economics,
economic analysis keyed solely to 'efficiency' and 'consumer welfare'
7. Big business is necessary for military mobilization, efficiency, and techno-
logical progress.
Id. at 10-11.
14 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
The new advocates assert several doubtful contentions. They assert that selection of the
efficiency-standard is apolitical, and that their proffered conceptions of efficiency are norm-
free; that there is one efficient solution to competition problems, and that the efficient solution
is discoverable; and that, apart from efficiency, there is no appropriate or workable touchstone
for antitrust policy. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12; R. BORK, supra note 13; R.
POSNER, supra note 13. But see Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
Professors Areeda and Turner do not limit their approach to microeconomic analysis
confined to output limitation, supra note 12. In this respect, they are to be distinguished from
Professor Posner, who does, supra note 13, at 23. Areeda, Turner, and Posner are to be
distinguished from Professor Bork who recognizes output theory but adds a healthy gloss in
favor of freedom of business transactions or the status quo. R. BORK, supra note 13, ch. 4. See
Gellhorn, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1376, 1377 (1979) (reviewing R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX). Professors Areeda and Turner, however, join Professors Posner and
Bork in concluding that the efficiency principle makes antitrust rational and that there is no
other appropriate touchstone for antitrust policy. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, ch.
1, at 3-33; R. BORK, supra note 13, ch. 3, at 72-89; R. POSNER, supra note 13.
Is Neoclassical price-theory postulates that consumer welfare is maximized through output
decisions that are constrained by competitive pressures that push price down to marginal cost
(including a reasonable return on capital). Leading proponents of neoclassical price-theory
maintain that the only significant obstacle to maximizing consumer welfare is cartelization;
that is, agreements among competitors to limit production and raise price. E.g., R. POSNER,
supra note 13, at 23.
16 See R. BORK, supra note 13, at 116-17. This is only one view, however, and a most
conservative view, of the appropriate application of economics to antitrust. For recent Supreme
Court language that looks in this direction, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), in which Justice White, speaking for the Court, stated:
[O]ur inquiry [in characterizing conduct under the per se rule] must focus on
whether . . .the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output, . . . or instead one
designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
less, competitive."
Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
Other opinions take a more open approach and look to the preservation of dynamic
competition. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978) (Stevens, J.).
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has revealed with stark simplicity that there will be very little remain-
ing of antitrust." 17
III
THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST
Proponents of the view that efficiency is the purpose of antitrust
law claim support in the legislative history and in judicial interpreta-
tions of the antitrust statutes.1 8  They imply that the efficiency goal is
discovered and not chosen.19 However, the selection of efficiency as
the only appropriate touchstone of antitrust policy is not indicated by
either the statutory language, which is ambiguous, or the legislative
history, which is multivalued. Moreover, the case law that has devel-
oped over time does not, as Judge Wyzanski discerned, fit together as
do pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. 20 The isolation of efficiency as the sole
goal of antitrust requires a conscious rejection of equally dominant
values that underlie the antitrust statutes.
This section explores the dominant values of antitrust as revealed
by the two statutes commonly known as the federal antitrust laws: the
Sherman Act21 and the Clayton Act.22 The importance of identifying
these dominant values lies in the content they give or may give to the
statutory words of proscription -namely, "in restraint of trade," 23
"monopolize," 2 4 and "may be substantially to lessen competition." 25
17 Rowe, New Directions in Competition and Industrial Organization Law in the United States, in
ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80's, at 177, 201 (Rowe, Jacobs &Joelson eds. 1980).
s See note 76 infra.
1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, at 23; R. BORK, supra note 13, at 79; R.
POSNER, supra note 13; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18 (2d ed. 1977).
0 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
22 Id. §§ 12-27 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1154 (1980).
This Article does not address the Robinson-Patman (Price-Discrimination) Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976), or the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 58
(1976), as amended by 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
23 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
24 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony .... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Amendment of 1950
and the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1980 provides:
[N]o person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
1146 [Vol. 66:1140
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The Sherman Act, which is 'he oldest federal antitrust law, was
adopted in 1890 during an age of revolutionary industrialization.
Sprouting transportation networks brought into competition hundreds
of firms that had enjoyed local monopolies. Prospects of expanding
markets led to over-investment in productive facilities. Fierce and
disabling competition ensued. Competitors responded by truce. They
joined forces, usually in the form of trusts. They swallowed up hun-
dreds of small proprietors and stamped out others. Farmers, shippers,
and other suppliers and customers were, or so they believed, over-
charged and underpaid.26 The legislative history of the Sherman Act
illuminates the congeries of concerns that gave birth to that statute,
perhaps none so strong as the distrust of the perceived power of the
giant trusts. Urging enactment of a law against the trusts, Senator
Sherman spoke of the problems that agitate "the popular mind": 17
"[A]mong them all none is more threatening than the inequality of
condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single
generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combina-
tions."12 8  Senator Sherman posited the case in which "combinations
reduce prices . .. by better methods of production." Even such a
combination would not be justified, Senator Sherman said, because
"[the] saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producers." 2 9
While Senator Sherman denounced the trusts as tyrants,3 0 Sena-
tor Pugh observed that the trusts had the power to limit production
and thereby increase price "oppressive[ly] and merciless[ly]." 3'
Senator Vest observed that if you "create competition you then secure
lower prices to the consumer." 32  Representative Mason addressed
yet a different concern, "Even if the price of oil is reduced to one cent
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1154 (1980).
26 H. THORELLI, supra note 6, at 143-44. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 311-23 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
27 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890).
8 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 2457. Representative Taylor spoke of "this monster [, the trust, which] robs the
farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other." Id. at 4098. Senator Heard referred
to the beef trust as "this giant robber combination." Id. at 4101.
31 Id. at 2558.
32 Id. at 2466.
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a barrel, it would not right the wrong done to the people by the trusts
which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest men
from legitimate business." 33
The quoted statements well reflect the diverse concerns, as well
as the rhetoric, that produced the Sherman Act. Members of Con-
gress reflected the concern of the people with the perceived power and
greed of the trusts, with the exploitation of those who dealt with the
trusts, and with the demise of the small industrial proprietor.
In the early years, the Supreme Court applied the Sherman Act
to loose combinations (understandings among independent competi-
tors) and abusive acts by single firms with market power in a manner
that reflected the multivalued legislative history and the desire to
protect competition for the benefit of-all -consumers, entrepreneurs,
and "the public good." 34 However, the Court ignored the anticom-
petitive effects of tight combinations effected by mergers and acquisi-
tions. 35  Moreover, it announced principles of law in amorphous
terms ("unreasonable" restraints were banned 36), giving business
little information as to what activities were prohibited. Consequently
supporters of big and little business alike became disenchanted with
the Sherman Act. 37
In 1912, Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United
States. He promised The New Freedom. He offered the "little man"
the chance to succeed, and he promised business greater certainty. 38
In 1914, with the President's encouragement and support, Congress
passed the Clayton Act, which enumerated specific antitrust violations
(although not with the promised clarity), and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which created the Federal Trade Commission to
monitor and prevent business abuse and to provide guidance to busi-
nesses.
39
33 Id. at 4100.
34 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (abusive acts by single firm);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896) (self-regulation by
agreement among competitors).
35 See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). But see Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 329 (1904).
38 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (dictum).
37 G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 17 (1924).
38 G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 209-10 (1963).
" Id. at 267; Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1154 (1980) (§ 7 of the Clayton
Act)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 313, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980)).
Wilson's ardor dissipated and the bill was weakened. A. LINK, WILSON, THE NEw
FREEDOM, ch. XIII (1956). Nonetheless, the law as passed was stronger than the Sherman Act.
1148 [Vol. 66:1140
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If there is one central theme of the legislative history of the
Clayton Act, it is freedom of economic opportunity. 40 The Clayton
Act promised to open the field "to scores of men who had been
obliged to serve when their abilities entitled them to direct." 4 1 Con-
sumers' interests were an ancillary concern, reflected in Congress's
desire to limit producers' power over prices. Legislators wished
"properly [to] control. . . the great industrial corporation that really
has power-the power to arbitrarily control prices and thus exact
unjust profits from the people." 42
From the passage of the Clayton Act to mid-century, antitrust
paled in the shadow of critical events: World War I; the Depression;
recovery under New Deal programs that favored business coopera-
tion; the rise of Hitler with the help of the German cartels; and World
War 11. 4 3 During these years the Supreme Court applied antitrust
principles much as it had done in the early years of the Sherman Act.
It protected competition and kept markets open where contracts,
conspiracies, and loose combinations were concerned, 4 4 but it did not
apply the law to check increasing concentrations through mergers. 45
A merger movement arose in the wake of World War 11.46 States-
men and legislators looked on the movement with alarm. They
thought too much power was falling in the hands of too few businesses
40 See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Reed:
[W]e wrote it into our creed, that all men were created free and equal, and that all
are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We construed "liberty" to
mean not merely the right to walk upon the streets of cities. . . but liberty. . . to
engage in commerce, to solve for one's self the problem of one's own happiness and
success ...
So we began enacting legislation calculated to produce a condition which
would leave open for all men, big and little, the opportunity to engage in the affairs
of life.
51 CONe. REc. 15867 (1914).
41 Addressing a joint session of Congress on Trusts and Monopolies, President Wilson
commented on a limitation on interlocking directorates:
It will bring new men, new energies, and a new spirit of initiative, new blood, into
the management of our great business enterprises. It will open the field of indus-
trial development and origination to scores of men who have been obliged to serve
when their abilities entitled them to direct.
Address by the President on Trusts and Monopolies before the Joint Session of Congress (Jan.
20, 1914), H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1914).
11 51 CONG. REc. 9265 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Morgan).
43 See generally E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY (1952).
4" See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940).
4' See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
46 F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 49 (2d ed.
1980).
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and that such concentration would impair economic opportunity,
deprive individuals of control over their own lives, and threaten the
very existence of free enterprise and political democracy. 47 In 1938
President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave this message to Congress:
"[T]he liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the
growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than
their democratic state itself. . . .Among us today a concentration of
private power without equal in history is growing." 48
Responding to the President's call, Congress passed a joint reso-
lution creating the Temporary National Economic Committee
(TNEC) to study the causes and effects of economic concentration and
to offer solutions to the problems it was thought to pose. 49  After
extensive hearings, the TNEC recommended the passage of law to
halt the merger movement. 50 The FTC likewise issued reports calling
for legislative and regulatory remedies to halt the growth of economic
concentration. 5' In 1950, apparently influenced by the TNEC and
FTC reports and spurred by the Supreme Court's refusal to enjoin
U.S. Steel's acquisition of the largest West Coast steel fabricator,5 2
Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver Amendment 53 to the Clayton
Act, extending the coverage of the antimerger law.
The legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment speaks
clearly and overwhelmingly of the social evils of "concentration." ' 54
The legislators who supported the Amendment did so on grounds of
the dangers of increasing economic concentration, not on grounds of
the virtues of efficiency. 55 The most outspoken of the legislators,
4 See E. GOLDMAN, supra note 43, at 453.
48 83 CONG. REC. 5992 (1938).
49 52 Stat. 705 (1938).
50 Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, S. Doc. No.
35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1941).
" E.g., Report of the Federal Trade Commission? reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 515 Before the
Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Judiciary Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 300-17 (1947).
5 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
C Oh. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1976), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1154 (1980)). The amendment extended coverage to
asset acquisitions. The Clayton Act had previously applied only to stock acquisitions. Further,
the amendment deleted language that would proscribe only acquisitions that may substantially
lessen competition between the acquired and acquiring companies, and replaced it with
language proscribing all acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition in any market.
Id. See B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 7.03[2] (1981).
' H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1950); 96 CONG. REC. 16434 (1950) (remarks of Sen. O'Connor); id. at 16450, 16452
(remarks of Sen. Kefauver). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
" Congress wished to preserve a society of many small businesses. We may assume that it
did not mean to harm the consumer. Apparently, the legislators thought that the consumer
would profit by, rather than suffer from, competition among numerous independent busi-
nesses. Representative Celler's comments convey the major thrust of the hearings and debates:
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including the bill's sponsors, wished to preserve a society of small,
independent, decentralized businesses in order to disperse economic
and political power and to assure that a Hitler could never rise to
power in America.5 6
The case law construing the Celler-Kefauver Amendment was
faithful to the legislative spirit. In the 1960s and early 19 7 0s, the
Supreme Court applied the merger law to prevent increasing concen-
tration of business assets into the hands of fewer competitors.5 7  Com-
petition was defined by the Court as a process that required numerous
participants and decentralization.58 Competition was equated by the
Court with deconcentration; and increasing concentration, by defini-
tion, lessened competition because it removed an independent source
of competitive effort. 9 Applying the merger law to prevent concen-
tration,6 0 the Court protected competition as the Court defined it and
as the legislature had viewed it.
The Court adopted a parallel approach to cases not involving
mergers. It declared that the law prohibited contract restraints that
"clogged" the channels of competition and deprived firms of an equal
chance to compete on the merits in free and open markets.6 1  It
Small, independent, decentralized business of the kind that built up our
country . . . is fast disappearing, and second, is being made dependent upon
monster concentration.
It is very difficult now for small business to compete against the financial,
purchasing, and advertising power of the mammoth corporations.
Do not make that competition even more difficult by failing to plug this
loophole in the Clayton Act.
95 CONG. REC. 11486 (1949).
r Representative Celler said:
I want to point out the danger of this trend toward more and better combines.
I read from a report filed with [the former Secretary of War] as to the history of the
cartelization and concentration of industry in Germany: "Germany under the
Nazi set-up built up a great series of industrial monopolies in steel, rubber, coal
and other materials. The monopolies soon got control of Germany, brought Hitler
to power and forced virtually the whole world into war."
I do not want to see my country go the way of Japan or the way of Italy or the
way of Germany or even the way of England.
Id. at 11486. See remarks of Senator Kefauver, 96 CONG. REC. 16452 (1950). See also F.
NEUMANN, BEHEMOUTH 22-23 (1942).
' Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
' See note 57 supra. See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 369
(1962).
59 See note 57 supra.
60 See notes 57-58 supra.
"' E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1968); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v.
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protected the freedom of the independent trader to sell where and to
whom the seller pleased . 2 The Court sometimes invoked consumers'
interests, but only when consumers' interests were consistent with
competition as process and the rights of free traders.a In applying
the antitrust laws from the 1950s to the early 1970s, the Court empha-
sized freedom of traders and competition among many players, not
efficiency. 
4
Beginning in 1974, the first year of the Burger Court's antitrust
majority, antitrust law shifted course. 5  In a 1977 opinion, the Su-
preme Court said that market impact must control antitrust deci-
sionsA6  Market impact was assessed in terms of efficiency. In addi-
tion, majority opinions by some members of the Court began to reveal
a strong undercurrent that business should be left presumptively free
to do what it wishes, apparently on the theory that business freedom
tends to maximize efficiency or on the theory that greater private
business freedom is crucial to a free society.67  Whereas the word
"power" dominated Warren Court antitrust opinions, 6 the words
"efficiency" and "market impact" have prominence in Burger Court
antitrust opinions.6 9 The Burger Court has not given "efficiency"
specific content. Moreover, recent opinions of the Court have trig-
gered the claim that antitrust is valid only as a means to promote
efficiency.
As history teaches, "efficiency" is not the reason for antitrust. 70
Indeed, those who valued efficiency more than competition opposed
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 12 (1964); United States v. Lowe's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 347 U.S. 521 (1954), aff'ingper
curiam 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),further divestiture ordered, 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 312 (1949), Justice Frankfurter said
for the Court: "[T]he choice between greater efficiency and freer competition. . . has not been
submitted to our decision." Congress had decided in favor of freer competition.
" United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
63 E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
6 See notes 61-62 supra.
5 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 411 U.S. 1 (1979);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602 (1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
" Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
67 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977). Compare R. BORK, supra note 13, with
M. FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE (1980).
6" See, e.g., note 8 supra.
69 See, e.g., note 65 supra.
" J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 9-10, 15-16. See McChesney, On the Economics of
Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1103, 1104 (1980) ("[T]here is no reason to assume that
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antitrust bills on grounds that they would constrain some activity that
might save costs for a producer and forbid some activity that does not
interfere with optimal allocation of resources. 71 Rather than standing
for efficiency, the American antitrust laws stand against private
power. Distrust of power is the one central and common ground that
over time has unified support for antitrust statutes. 72 Interests of
consumers have been a recurrent concern because consumers have
been perceived as victims of the abuse of too much power. Interests of
entrepreneurs and small business have been a recurrent concern be-
cause independent entrepreneurs have been seen as the heart and
efficiency requires an antitrust system. [Anticompetitive practices tend to correct themselves in
the long run.] ...[A] society that values efficiency will not necessarily demand an antitrust
system.").
Nor was "efficiency" the central reason for the American free enterprise system. The
United States embraced a market system rather than government ownership of business or
governmentally directed allocation of resources because freedom of private economic action
and decentralized centers of decisionmaking were components of the American democracy.
Even if centralized government control of resource allocation were regarded as more efficient
than private-firm competition, since it avoids the wastes of competition (J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN,
supra note 6, at 16), it seems likely that most Americans would gladly have sacrificed that
increased efficiency for increased freedom. See Hoover, Rugged Individualism Speech (Oct.
22, 1928), reprinted in II GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD
1864-1957, at 338, 341 (Hofstadter, ed. 1958) (asserting that even if government could run
business more efficiently, Americans would choose free enterprise). See also M. FRIEDMAN, Supra
note 67; C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977); B. WARD, THE IDEAL WORLDS OF
ECONOMICS (1979); Hayek, The Moral Element in Free Enterprise, and other essays in THE
INVISIBLE HAND 69 (A. Classen ed. 1965).
71 See Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 555 (1973),
describing the view of economists at the time of the passage of the Sherman Act that the
market, unconstrained by antitrust, would produce efficiencies:
If anything, the tendency of the American Economic Association [in 1890] was to
question the wisdom of any legislation directed against "monopoly" in the eco-
nomic sense, since the prevalent economists' view was that monopoly power,
unbuttressed by legal supports such as patents, tariffs, licensing and the like, was
by its nature rapidly eroded by, market forces, and that legislative intervention
would either impede that process or involve unnecessary social costs.
Id. at 577. See also III DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: 1865-1918,
at 117-24 (1949).
72 Dispersion of economic power serves economic and political goals. Politically, dispersion
tends to prevent any one firm or combination of firms from having undue access to the political
system. Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053-54 (1979). See
Brodley, supra note 1, at 871; 21 CONo. REc. 2457, 2459-60 (1890) (Sherman Act debates-re-
marks of Sen. Sherman). Economically, dispersion tends to promote flexibility of firms to
respond to new and changing consumer needs. Concentration may tend to calcify and rigidify.
See B. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977); Taber, supra note 9, at 40 (quoting Scitovsky). But
see Bock, Concentration: Issues, Convictions and Facts, Overview, Holmes, Concentration and Prices, and
Benston, Differences in Perceptions, all in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM,
supra note 6, at 167, 186, 196.
Dispersion is sometimes associated with increased risks as well as increased incentives,
initiative, flexibility, and responsiveness. Concentration is sometimes associated with increased
security, as well as bureaucracy, complacency and rigidity. B. KLEIN, supra.
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lifeblood of American free enterprise, and freedom of economic activ-
ity and opportunity has been thought central to the preservation of the
American free enterprise system.
One overarching idea has unified these three concerns (distrust of
power, concern for consumers, and commitment to opportunity for
entrepreneurs): competition as process. The competition process is the
preferred governor of markets. 73 If the impersonal forces of competi-
tion, rather than public or private power, determine market behavior
and outcomes, power is by definition dispersed, opportunities and
incentives for firms without market power are increased, and the
results are acceptable and fair. 74  Some measure of productive and
allocative efficiency is a by-product, because competition tends to
stimulate lowest-cost production and allocate resources more respon-
sively than a visible public or private hand.7
5
In sum, the claim that efficiency has been the goal and the fulcrum
of antitrust is weak at best. The values other than efficiency that
underlie the commitment to power dispersion, economic opportunity,
and competition as market governor demand equal attention. The
basis upon which some scholars affirmatively have rejected these his-
toric objectives as goals of antitrust 76 is not apparent. The reasons
offered do not withstand scrutiny.
77
11 In practice, United States markets are neither perfectly competitive nor impersonal. It is
not feasible to restore the invisible hand of competition at this stage of industrialization and
technological development. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND (1977). However, it is
feasible to maintain competition as process to the extent consistent with consumer interests.
I "Fair" is used to connote that the results of an impersonal process set into place by social
contract are generally accepted as fair.
" But see Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY
LAW 69 (B. Ackerman ed. 1976).
76 Professor Bork takes the position, despite overwhelming legislative history to the con-
trary, that the sole goal of the Sherman Act is to maximize consumer welfare. See R. BORK,
supra note 13, ch. 2, at 50-71. But see generally 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2459-60 (1890) (Sherman
Act debates). See also id. at 1570, 2457, 2459-60 (remarks of Sen. Sherman); R. HOFSTADTER,
What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 200 (1965); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 153 (1977); H.
THORELLI, supra note 6, ch. IV, at 134-265; Brodley, supra note 1, at 867; Flynn, supra note 1;
Letwin, supra note 12; Letwin, English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
355 (1954); Pitofsky, supra note 72; Schwartz, supra note 1.
Professor Bork notwithstanding, the Sherman Act was directed against the power of and
abuses by great integrated enterprises, despite their achievement of unequalled efficiencies. See,
e.g., Chandler, Historical Perspectives and Political Protest, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE
MARKET SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 214; A. NEVINs, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER (1940); The Sherman
Act Debates, supra note 72.
Professor Posner agrees with Professor Bork that the antitrust laws were designed princi-
pally to maximize consumer welfare. In Antitrust Law, Posner states:
The framers of the Sherman Act appear to have been concerned mainly with the
price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels, whereas the common law
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The elevation of efficiency to the antitrust pedestal reflects some-
thing other than deference to stare decisis and something more than a
choice of the only feasible route to reasonably clear antitrust princi-
ples. It, like all other choices for antitrust policy, reflects a normative
judgment about what antitrust should do.
IV
MICROECONOMICS, POLITICAL THEORY, AND
PERSONAL STAKE
Recognizing that the choice of efficiency as the fulcrum of anti-
trust reflects a value judgment, this section identifies bases on which
that choice may be made. One explanation is professional training in
economics or other personal orientation toward exclusive use of an
of monopolies and restraints of trade had a miscellany of objectives mostly unre-
lated and sometimes antipathetic to competition and efficiency....
... The Sherman Act did not enact the common law of restraint of trade. A
better guide to interpreting the Sherman Act is the economic analysis of monopoly.
R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 23-24 (omitted footnotes cite solely to an article by Professor
Bork).
Professors Areeda and Turner are more generous in their acknowledgement of history.
They refer to some political and social concerns of the antitrust laws. However, they, too,
brush aside such concerns and decide that non-economic purposes are not important to
antitrust. 1 P. ARREDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, ch. 1, at 3-33. The Areeda and Turner
interpretation contrasts with the earlier Kaysen and Turner interpretation, which stated:
It is obvious that in passing the Sherman Act, "Congress was dealing with
competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to pre-
vent." The legislators were well aware of the common law on restraints of trade,
and of the power of monopolists to hurt the public by raising price, deteriorating
product, and restricting production. At the same time, there was at least equal
concern with the fate of small producers driven out of business, or deprived of the
opportunity to enter it, by "all-powerful aggregations of capital." There was no
obvious inconsistency in these two interests.
[I]t seems probable that [the legislators] also desired to protect equal
opportunity and equal access for small business for noneconomic reasons ....
C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 19 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
77 The reasons offered for discounting non-efficiency goals are unsatisfactory. The com-
mentators who discount these goals claim that they are too vague and that equalization of
economic opportunity and preservation of competition as a process will protect inefficient firms
and harm consumers. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, ch. I (equalization of
economic opportunity); R. BORK, supra note 13 (preservation of competition process). But see I
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, at 293 (rejoinder to Bork).
All of the basic goals of antitrust, however, were given specific meaning during the
Warren Court years; the developed principles are capable of further refinements and they can
be retained without protecting inefficiencies. For example, as a rule of thumb, it was illegal for
any leading competitor in a concentrated or concentrating market to remove any substantial
competitor, supplier or buyer, by acquisition; and it was illegal per se to impose customer or
territory restrictions on buyers. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Justice
Department Merger Guidelines, 1968, reprinted in B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 53, App. 11. For
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efficiency principle to analyze market problems. Individuals schooled
in economics are trained to think about how markets work and how
consumers may be satisfied. Economics teaches that markets work to
maximize the material well-being of people. Business behavior that
maximizes aggregate material well-being is deemed "efficient." Eco-
nomics as a discipline values competition only as a process for the
production of "efficient" outcomes. 78
Introduction of non-economic values may be threatening or both-
ersome to individuals attempting to apply economics. The non-eco-
nomic values are foreign matter, and the discipline rejects them.
Yet another basis for choosing efficiency as the fulcrum of anti-
trust is political philosophy. Certain political philosophies correspond
with certain conceptions of what antitrust should do. The conservative
and libertarian world-views lean towards less government interven-
tion, in order to protect the established order and stability, or to
maximize (a view of) individual freedom. Individuals having these
perspectives question the existence of corporate power. The power
that resides in one central government is far more worrisome to them
than power that may reside in a number of private businesses. They
see market entry barriers as almost always low and surmountable by
skill and energy, and they view consumers as sovereign-that is, the
controllers of producer behavior. They believe that all people of equal
abilities have equality of economic opportunity, that those business
people who serve consumers best will succeed, and that any attempt to
equalize opportunity in the marketplace (like affirmative action) frus-
trates meritocracy.79 If the job of antitrust is, and is only, to prohibit
transactions that impair efficiency, then government interference with
private business transactions is minimized and the values of a free
society (as they define it) are preserved. Therefore, the conservative
and libertarian philosophies tend to correspond with the view that
antitrust should be limited to a narrow role in monitoring efficiency.
By contrast, the liberal8" tends to distrust large aggregations of
wealth and power. The liberal world-view sees private corporate
power as a reality and a danger. The liberal view tends to regard entry
application of multivalued goals in ways that will not protect inefficiencies, see text at section
VIIB infra.
71 See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 508-09 (1 1th ed. 1980). Consumer surplus is one measure
of consumer satisfaction. Consumer surplus represents the difference between what consumers
would be willing to pay for a given quantity of goods and what they actually pay. Id. at 412-14.
79 I. KRISTOL, Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM (1978); B. WARD, supra note 70, Book Three;
Demsetz, The Trust Behind Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM,
supra note 6; Hayek, supra note 70, at 77.
50 "Liberal" here refers to its twentieth century political meaning. The word does not refer
to the eighteenth century laissez-faire liberal.
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barriers to markets as high and often insurmountable and producers
as sovereign and manipulative of consumer wants. Liberals tend to
perceive great inequalities of economic opportunity caused by, among
other things, power wielded and barriers strategically placed by large,
established firms. The liberal view is compatible with government
intervention to prevent concentrations of power and wealth and pro-
mote greater equality of economic opportunity.8 The liberal philoso-
phy, therefore, tends to correspond with the multivalued view of
antitrust. Indeed, at the extreme, the liberal might prefer dispersion
of power and greater economic opportunity for business without
power to efficiency.82
A variety of other factors apparently influence individuals' judg-
ments about what antitrust should do. Some individuals form a judg-
ment that a central concern with American economic and derivatively
political strength in the world is more important than a central con-
cern for consumers. Others have a preference for limiting the discre-
tion of the judiciary. Business managers may desire freer rein or
greater profits. Each of the above concerns may lead toward a nar-
rower role for antitrust, One obvious way to minimize the influence of
antitrust is to confine it to the role of increasing efficiency, and to
define efficiency in terms of business autonomy.
V
THE CONCEPTS OF EFFICIENCY
CLAIMED FOR ANTITRUST
The foregoing sections explored a variety of goals of antitrust,
expressed by legislators and jurists, including but not limited to effi-
ciency. In this section, we focus our attention on efficiency, and shall
discover that the spectrum of views as to how antitrust should produce
or conduce to efficiency is nearly as wide as the spectrum of views as
to what ends antitrust should serve. Virtually all contemporary
scholars and jurists agree that antitrust law and enforcement should
tend to increase the responsiveness of producers to consumers' wants,
and many maintain that it should tend to optimize the use of scarce
resources. There is, however, vigorous disagreement about the appro-
priate conceptual mode for attempting to attain the desired end.
Approaches vary from reliance on interaction among numerous, rival-
rous competitors to reliance on business judgment.
81 C. LINDBLOM, supra note 70; B. WARD, supra note 70, Book One;, Schlesinger, Is
Liberalism Dead?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1980, § 6 (Magazine).
82 See B. WARD, supra note 70; Sullivan, supra note 1.
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Thus, the notion that efficiency should be the guide to antitrust
analysis on the theory that it provides a clear and certain path and
eliminates the need for difficult choices among conflicting policy
values is false. The very selection of one or another approach to
efficiency involves confrontation of the same, difficult questions of
policy.
As two distinguished scholars have discerned:
The proposal [for using solely economic concepts in appraising all
acts supposed to violate the antitrust laws] offers not the prospect of
greater certainty and shorter litigation . . . but utter confusion.
Economists are no more likely to agree than lawyers; only a disillu-
sioned lawyer or a brash economist could believe otherwise.83
This section analyzes three approaches to assessing efficiency for
purposes of antitrust. The first approach calls for microeconomic
calculations to determine whether challenged activity is likely to lead
to restriction of output. Using this approach, individuals applying
welfare economics measure "producer and consumer welfare," the
sum of which is "social welfare." Proponents urge that antitrust
should reach only acts that artificially lower and thereby impair social
welfare.
A second approach relies on business autonomy, limited only by
the clearest evidence that private action wastes resources. This con-
ception assumes that business bahavior is efficient. By this approach,
antitrust would have a yet narrower role. The third concept is preser-
vation of competition as a process. This conception focuses upon
rivalrous interaction among numerous firms in "free and open" mar-
kets and protects access and opportunity of firms without market
power. This approach assumes that the process protected is likely to
produce the best result for consumers.
This Article does not presume to resolve, by economic argument,
the contest among and even within the three perspectives. s4 Indeed,
the persistence of debate among the economists may lend support to
the proposition that economics holds no one answer. Against this
8 J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 269-70.
8 For an illustration of the illusory qualities of the pursuit of "efficiency," see T. ARNOLD,
THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 168-71 (1937), wherein Arnold "proves" that efficiency is
inefficiency and that humanitarianism, which is alleged to be the object of efficiency, is
inhumane.
For an example of the diversity of views among economists, compare Demsetz, The Trust
Behind Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 45,
with Posner, supra note 13, and Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 949
(1979) and Adams, Antitrust and a Free Economy, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE
MARKET SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 33.
[Vol. 66:11401158
1981] MODERNIZATION OF ANTITRUST 1159
background, we turn to three conceptual modes of describing effi-
ciency.
A. Restriction of Output
Proponents of the output-restriction approach assert that anti-
trust lawsuits should be brought only to challenge inefficient transac-
tions or conduct, and that inefficiency should be measured by the
power of producers to restrict output.8 5 Even if artificial output-re-
striction is threatened, proponents may require the antitrust enforcer
or jurist to examine whether enforcement would frustrate achievement
of scale economies. Enforcement would proceed only if resource loss
from failure to achieve scale economies does not outweigh resource
loss from artificial output restriction.
8 6
Proponents assert that the only goal of antitrust is to improve
allocative efficiency. The output-restriction theory is applied as the
means to that end." Therefore, understanding of output limitation
theory requires understanding of allocative efficiency.
For an example of the diversity among individuals who use welfare economics as their
guide, compare R. POSNER, supra note 13, with F. SCHERER, supra note 46. Much of the
diversity can be explained by different assumptions regarding the speed with which market
forces will discipline exploitative and weak producers and catalyze the flow of resources into
noncompetitive markets, and, conversely, the height of barriers that may obstruct successful
challenge by newcomers to established firms.
's In a perfectly competitive market, no producers have power over output. All are price
takers. If a producer restricts its output and charges more than the going market price, it will
lose all of its sales and its competitors will increase production to fill the gap.
At the other extreme, in a high-barrier monopoly or tight oligopoly, where consumers
have no close alternatives and neither potential suppliers nor fringe producers can move swiftly
into a breach, the producers are price makers. Not only do they have the ability to set price
above cost, with correspondingly lower output, since fewer units will ordinarily be sold at the
higher price, but they have the economic incentive to do so. If the market is occupied by a
monopolist, the monopolist itself will determine and set its profit-maximizing price. If the
market is dominated by oligopolists, the producers cannot legally agree on the price that
maximizes their joint profits. However, market conditions may be conducive to interdependent
behavior, such as price leadership, whereby the firms might arrive at an oligopoly price without
agreement. In either case, the result is a price that is higher than the theoretically optimal
price. Consumers who wish to buy the goods at the competitive price but are unwilling to buy
at the monopoly price are likely to divert their purchases to a substitute product. Thus,
producers devote too few resources to the production of the monopoly good and too many
resources to the production of alternative goods, and society's scarce resources are thereby
misallocated.
86 W. BAXTER, P. COOTNER & K. SCOTT, RETAIL BANKING IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE: THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER, ch. 5 (1977). The enforcer may balance
loss of the incentive to innovate, along with resource loss from output restriction, against loss of
resources that would result from below optimal scale. Id. at 84-91. See Muris, The Efficiency
Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 381 (1980), advocating an
efficiencies defense in merger cases.
V See id.; R. POSNER, supra note 13.
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Allocative efficiency is an ideal state. It contemplates that all
resources across all markets in the economy are allocated to their best
use in view of consumer wants and willingness to pay the price it costs
society to make and distribute the goods. In a state of perfect alloca-
tive efficiency, the fewest possible resources are consumed to satisfy
consumer wants. In such a state, the aggregate wealth of the nation is
maximized, and individuals as consumers are assumed to be better
off.
Because of the multitude of imperfections in markets in our
economy, allocative efficiency cannot be achieved; the necessary con-
ditions cannot be met. 8s  Further, alteration of some conditions
within one or another market to improve output therein does not
necessarily even tend towards allocative efficiency. If, for example,
resources are drawn into an oligopoly market from a monopoly mar-
ket in an attempt to improve output in the former, the allocation of
resources may be further distorted rather than improved.89
Tendencies toward optimal output in a market will, however,
improve the position of consumers as buyers of the targeted product,
because more units of that product will be available. In addition, the
greater output will have a distributive effect, because all units gener-
ally will be available at a lower price. The lower price to the buyer of
88 Allocative efficiency in a free enterprise economy can be achieved only if all firms are of
sufficient size to realize all significant economies of scale, and all markets are either competi-
tively structured (that is, they comprise a significant number of producers with no one or few
having market dominance) or entry barriers are low. In such cases, all producers are price
takers; the market, not the producers, sets the price. The market forces cause resources to
move to the production of goods that consumers want, given the distribution of wealth. Prices
move down to marginal cost, and output is optimal to serve consumer wants at that cost. F.
SCHERER, supra note 46, ch. 2.
Optimal allocation of resources is frustrated by externalities, market imperfections, and
the problem of the second best. Externalities are costs that are imposed by a business firm that
are not borne by that firm, such as certain costs of pollution. Thus, externalities are social costs
not accounted for in private costs. Because the price of the good does not reflect its full cost,
consumers get the "wrong" signal and will buy too much of that product. Therefore, output
will be inefficiently high. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 78, at 449-50.
Market imperfections are defects in the functioning of markets. Malfunction may be
caused by monopoly, the absence of information, and government regulation. Market imper-
fections that increase the price of a product give the wrong signal to consumers. Consumers will
buy too little of the product, and output will be inefficiently low.
The problem of the second best connotes the circumstance that an apparently second best
solution may be no solution at all. Corrective action in one market does not necessarily
improve resource allocation. For example, conversion of pricing in one market from monopoly
pricing to competitive pricing does not improve resource allocation if resources are drawn from
another monopoly or a limited monopoly market. Resources would then be drawn from a
market in which output is already too low, causing output in the market of deflected demand to
be even lower. Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, XXIV Rav. EcON. STUD.
11, 17 (1956).
11 See note 88 supra.
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the targeted product may be a worthy objective,90 but it is not an
efficiency concern. The efficiency loss is, rather, "the loss associated
with substituting an alternative good for the monopolized good." 9
Thus, society loses not because producers extract surplus, from con-
sumers, but because demand is deflected from goods in the monopo-
lized market to other goods that cost society more resources to make.
1. Output Restriction and the Measurement of Social Welfare Loss
In view of the absence of tools to measure resource misallocation
caused by private acts, a number of economic theorists have adopted
as a proxy the measurement of artificial output restraints within given
markets. They frequently identify their goal as maximization of con-
sumer welfare. As a consequence, the goal of preventing artificial
output restraint and the goal of maximizing consumer welfare have
become synonymous to many students, practitioners, and policy
makers.
The terminology "social welfare" and "consumer welfare" may
create confusion. The layperson may be led to believe that the words
encompass all consumer interests, or that the well-being of the indi-
vidual who buys the product in the market of the restricted output is
the object of the economist's concern. This is not the case. The
economic theory described is concerned with maximization of "social
welfare." The social welfare loss is a resource loss -that is, the use of
unnecessary resources to satisfy the diverted demand of individuals
who would have been satisfied with a product in the market of the
restricted output if that product were sold at cost.
In short, welfare economics uses "welfare" and "consumer wel-
fare" in a technical sense that does not necessarily correspond with
general notions of consumer interests. "Consumer welfare" does not
reflect the interest of consumers in preventing monopolists from ex-
tracting monopoly profits. It ignores various other consumer interests
that may be expected to flow from a competitive economy, including
diversity of source, variety of product, and innovation. To avoid
perpetuating the confusion caused by use of the technical phrase
00 Professor Sullivan concludes:
[T]here is no theoretical reason to assume that maintaining competition in any
given market will tend toward the goal of optimum resource allocation in the
welfare sense. . . . However, maintaining competition in any industry will in that
industry tend toward prices which are closely related to cost, efficient methods of
production and distribution, and the social and political goals of antitrust.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 21 n.5.
9' W. Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1075, 1084
(1980).
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"consumer welfare," this Article calls the welfare approach "output-
limitation theory."
Output limitation theory can be captured in a diagram. The
theoretical loss to society from the impairment of social welfare is
depicted as follows: 9
D
The rectangle repre- The triangle repre-
sents monopoly pro- mp Monopoly sents dead weight or
fit; a transfer of ; 10 Price
wealth from the con- U sumers lose and pro-
sumer to the monop- g ducers do not gain.
olist. cp Competitive
5 Price
500 1000 1500
QUANTITY (OUTPUT)
As the diagram demonstrates, the monopoly pricing causes lower
output. The rectangle at the left represents the amount produced and
sold at the monopoly price. The triangle at the right represents the
additional amount that in theory, could have been produced "profit-
ably" by the producer but which the monopolist refrained from pro-
ducing in order to protect its profit margin.
The microeconomic concern is not that some consumers pay the
monopoly price and are thereby successfully exploited by the monopo-
list. This phenomenon represents "merely" a transfer of wealth from
willing consumers to the monopolist. 3 The economic concern cen-
ters on the welfare triangle: Output in the market is too low in light of
consumer demand for the product at a competitive price. Too few of
92 In the diagram, the horizontal axis represents the quantity of the product produced, and
the vertical axis depicts the price of the product. The demand curve (D) slopes downward,
reflecting greater demand and greater output (quantity) at lower prices. The monopoly firm
will sell at the monopoly price of 10. At that price it can sell, and therefore it produces, 1,000
units. If the firm had been forced to price at the competitive price of 5, however, it would have
produced and sold 1,500 units. The shaded rectangle represents a transfer of wealth from
consumers to the monopolist. The shaded triangle represents the dead weight or welfare loss.
This triangle reflects the additional quantity that consumers wished to buy and were prepared
to buy at a compensatory price lower than the monopoly price; they did not buy this quantity
because they were unwilling to pay the monopoly price. The dead weight loss represents a loss
to society, because consumers lose and producers do not gain. It is an opportunity unrealized.
93 W. BAXTER, P. COOTNER & R. SCOTT, supra note 86, at 94; F. SCHERER, supra note 46, at
20; Kamerschen, Summary of the Economic Effects of Monopoly, in CALVANI & SIEGFRIED, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 20, 42 (1979); W. Schwartz, supra note 91.
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society's resources are allocated to this market, and the resources that
should be so allocated are diverted to more costly production.
2. The Goals and Limits of Policy Based on Output Restriction
Power to control output, or to increase control over output, may
result from monopoly, oligopoly, or conspiracy. This Article discusses
each of these three conditions below to demonstrate the necessary,
although not sufficient, conditions for an antitrust violation according
to output limitation theory. In the case of mere monopoly power or
oligopoly power, many economic theorists would require inquiry to
determine whether resource loss from output limitation is offset by
resource gain from increased productive efficiency (that is, lower cost
of inputs); and in all events, further inquiry is necessary to determine
whether producers performed an act that the law reprehends.
The economist's prime example of power to limit output is a
monopoly in a well-defined market, wherein the consumer has no
good substitute and barriers are too high for a potential entrant to
surmount. In the absence of any of the foregoing conditions, the
producer does not have power to limit output or, at the least, the
existence of alternatives seriously limits power.
United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa)14 is a promi-
nent example of alleged and adjudicated monopoly. Yet Alcoa would
fail the power test of the output theorists. Alcoa was the only domestic
producer of virgin aluminum. Foreign producers accounted for ten
percent of all virgin aluminum sold in the United States. Alcoa did
not extract monopoly profits, but realized only a reasonable rate of
return. If Alcoa had restricted its output and had tried to extract a
monopoly profit, the rise in price probably would have brought into
the United States a stream of imports to satisfy the residual demand,
or else new entry by American producers probably would have closed
the gap. If such were the facts, Alcoa did not have the power to control
output. Proponents of the output-control theory of antitrust would
conclude therefrom that Alcoa did not have monopoly status.
Oligopoly provides a second potential target for enforcement.
Oligopoly behavior is characterized by lack of competitiveness. That
condition is most likely to occur when only a few competitors occupy
the market, they have similar technology, similar costs, and general
commonality of interests, and barriers to entry are high. In such a
situation, theory predicts that the producers will act interdependently
and will price in lock-step to maximize their joint profits. At worst,
they may reduce output to a point that approaches the monopoly
condition. If any one of the conditions conducive to oligopoly behav-
" 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 194-5).
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ior is absent, however, as is usually the case, the producers generally
have little or no power to limit output.
Output limitation theory could have particular application to
mergers that produce or rigidify oligopoly, because the law repre-
hends anticompetitive mergers, and output limitation theory holds
that mergers that produce output limitation are anticompetitive; all
other mergers are not. The tender offer competition for Conoco pro-
vided a test of output theory. The competition occurred in the sum-
mer of 1981, at a time when government officials had announced that
antitrust enforcement policy would be based on the tendency of the
transaction to limit output.95
Conoco i5 the ninth largest oil company and the leading second-
tier oil company in the United States. Mobil is the second largest oil
company in the United States, and was one of the bidders for the stock
of Conoco. Du Pont, the largest American chemical company and a
leading user of petrochemical-based products sold by Conoco, was
another of the bidders. Du Pont won the tender offer battle, with the
blessing of the Department of Justice. 96
The Department was not concerned with the possible foreclosure
effect of a du Pont-Conoco merger, on grounds that the merger did
not tend to limit output. More remarkable was the facial credibility
accorded to Mobil's contention that a Mobil-Conoco marriage would
not lessen competition. 97 That contention, however, was predictably
spawned by the limits of output theory. Had an antitrust plaintiff been
put to its proof that Mobil's acquisition of Conoco would increase
Mobil's power or the power of the major American oil companies to
restrict the output of oil, Mobil would have had a reasonable chance
of defeating the antitrust charges. The domestic oil, industry is not
highly concentrated. In 1978, the four-company concentration ratio
was 28.11% for crude oil and condensate production and 31.4% for
refining capacity. 98 Proof of any one of the following sets of facts
probably would have defeated the claim that Mobil would gain power
to restrict output by acquisition of Conoco: (1) OPEC, and not the
95 See Fox, From Antitrust to a Trust-in Business, 28 AcROSS THE BOARD 59, 62 (Nov. 1981)
(The Conference Board).
" United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., [1981] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,795 (proposed final consent judgment, 1981).
97 See Mobil's Conoco Bid Sparks Moves by Justice Agency and Legislators, Wall St. J., July 10,
1981, at 3, col. 1.
The Department of Justice served a request for additional information upon Mobil.
Simultaneously, Assistant Attorney General Baxter issued an unusual announcement: "Issu-
ance reflects our need for additional information to reach a judgment whether antitrust
problems are present; it does not reflect even a tentative judgment that the acquisition would
be impermissible." Press Release, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, July 31, 1981.
" Three Views of the Merger Battle: Conoco's Case Against Two Bidders... Mobil's Reply... and
Seagram's Ire, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1981, § III (Business and Finance Section), at 2, col. 3.
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United States oil firms, controls output. (2) Exxon remains much
larger than Mobil; Mobil's increment in size would merely make
Mobil more competitive with Exxon and would not confer any power
over supply. (3) The market is so fragmented (no firm has ten percent
or more) and so many fringe firms and foreign producers could
expand output or divert production to the United States that the
necessary conditions for successful cooperative behavior are absent.
(4) If the leading domestic oil firms have market power, they already
extract the maximum excess profits from the consumer; they have
reached the limit of any output restriction.
Cartel agreements are a third means by which output limitation
can be achieved. Cartels are agreements among competitors to control
the market by fixing price, dividing customers or territories, or appor-
tioning production quotas. Such agreements are likely to achieve
market control only where there are relatively few producers in the
market, the producers have similar costs, they all are parties to the
agreement, and entry into the market is difficult. In the absence of
these conditions, the higher cartel price is likely to attract entry by
outsiders and induce cheating by insiders, and the cartel will self-de-
struct.99
In sum, output theory provides a basis for challenging monopoly
of a sort that virtually never exists, for challenging transactions such
as mergers that produce increments in the power to cut back produc-
tion (a condition that seldom can be proved), and for challenging
cartel agreements that have a chance of success.
A statute designed to implement output-restriction theory would
bear passing resemblance to the Sherman Act, but no resemblance to
the Clayton Act. This hypothetical statute would, by one scheme,
prohibit monopoly and oligopoly in well-defined high-barrier markets
unless productive efficiency outweighs dead weight loss. 10 0 When
'1 See McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conference and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L.
REv. 191, 196 (1960).
100 Scholarly debate persists as to whether, in some or many unregulated markets, econo-
mies of scale demand a size so large relative to the market that productive efficiency is
incompatible with the existence of the number of competitors necessary to produce effective
competition.
Professor Bork asserts that there are significant trade-offs between productive efficiency
and the degree of allocative efficiency that would be produced by competitive market pressures
from numerous competitors. R. BORK, supra note 13, ch. 6. Professors Areeda and Turner
hold the contrary view that a conflict between productive efficiency and competition is unlikely:
As to the choice between efficiency and competition, it might be feared that scale
economies are so pervasive and so continuous that either antitrust concern with
competitive structure should be abandoned, or, on the contrary, efficiencies should
be ignored lest they validate ever-increasing market concentration. Fortunately,
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productive efficiencies justify oligopoly, the law would prohibit collu-
sion among oligopolists, perhaps even some avoidable forms of inter-
dependence among them.10' Where arbitrage can be prevented, the
law would encourage price discrimination by justified monopolists or
oligopolists in order to maximize output to the point of consumer
willingness to buy at a price acceptable to the seller.102  There would
be no special merger law, and there would be no specific prohibitions
against exclusive dealing or tying. The law would permit market-shar-
ing, specialization, and price agreements among small firms and firms
in fragmented or low-barrier markets. The law would provide no right
of compensation to consumers "injured" by a monopoly or oligopoly
overcharge. Nor would it accord a right of compensation to "injured"
competitors. The only social harm recognized would be the resources
wasted in securing monopoly power and the harm reflected by the
welfare triangle 1 03 - that is, the resource loss caused by the failure of
producers to increase their production to the point that would satisfy
all consumers willing to pay at least a competitive price. 0 4  The law
would provide a remedy deemed sufficient to deter output restriction.
B. Business Autonomy
With increasing frequency, efficiency is defined in terms of busi-
ness freedom: maximizing, with only limited constraints, the freedom
or autonomy of firms to engage in private transactions of their choice.
the evidence largely undercuts such fears. As we have already noted, some concen-
tration is not inconsistent with workably competitive results. As we shall shortly
point out, the evidence indicates that least-cost output very rarely requires monop-
oly, and seldom requires high concentration.
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, at 293 (footnote omitted). Research by Professor
Scherer supports the Areeda-Turner conclusion. F. SCHERER, supra note 46, at 133-38.
101 Basing point pricing is an example of avoidable interdependence. See FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
102 If a monopolist could engage in perfect price discrimination by selling to each customer
at the price that customer is willing to pay, it would not have the incentive to restrict output.
The monopolist has the incentive to restrict output because the availability of units to some
buyers at a competitive price will induce those buyers to become arbitrageurs; they will buy at
the lower price and resell to the disfavored customers. The monopolist assumes that if it sells
any units at a competitive price it must forego its monopoly profit on all other units. Therefore,
unless the monopolist can prevent arbitrage, it charges only the higher monopoly price.
103 See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
104 See W. Schwartz, supra note 91, at 1081-85. Professor Schwartz writes:
There is no direct correlation between the monopolist's gain and social harm
because the gain consists of the redistribution of wealth associated with monopoly
pricing [not an efficiency concern], whereas the social loss consists of the resources
wasted in securing monopoly power and the misallocation of resources associated
with monopoly pricing.
Id. at 1082 n.27.
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The linkage between efficiency and autonomy may reflect one of
two quite different ideas or goals. First, proponents claim that auton-
omy conduces to productive efficiency; efficiency is the desired out-
come and autonomy is the means to that end. Second, advocacy of
business autonomy may serve social, political, or personal objectives
by minimizing government interference with business decision-mak-
ing. A pragmatic way to minimize the role of government in antitrust
is to confine antitrust to the role of increasing efficiency and, in turn,
to define efficiency in terms of business autonomy. 10 5
The claim that autonomy conduces to efficiency may be stated as
follows: Business firms are profit-maximizing. Private decisionmaking
tends to maximize productive efficiency, because the firm itself knows
best how to reduce costs and satisfy consumers. Competition among
productively efficienct firms tends to maximize allocative efficiency,
because the competitive pressure exerted by such firms is the best spur
to improved performance and to investment decisions that are respon-
sive to consumer wants. 10
6
Antitrust law historically has valued freedom and autonomy of
firms without market power.10 7  In contemporary debates, however,
proponents seek increased autonomy for firms with leading and domi-
nant positions in concentrated markets. 08 Increased autonomy could
mean preference for freedom of firms with power at the expense of
105 See Rowe, New Directions in Competition and Industrial Organization Law in the United States, in
ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80's, at 177, 201 (F. Rowe, F. Jacobs & M. Joelson eds. 1980).
108 See R. BORK, supra note 13.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972):
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of
our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
Topco was later approved in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978) and California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes took a contrary view. He construed the Sherman Act as
the embodiment of the English common law against restraints of trade. The English common
law sought to protect the liberty of people to practice their craft or trade. It did not prevent
cooperation among competitors, as long as that cooperation did not exclude others from plying
their trade. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Holmes's permissiveness toward competitor cooperation was never accepted as a
basis for antitrust policy. Rather, a quite different concept of freedom of trade and commerce
has become deeply embedded in our American antitrust law. See, e.g., United States v. Topco
Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
108 See., e.g., R. BORK, supra note 13.
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competitive opportunity for firms without power, and possibly at the
expense of lower price or greater choice for the consumer.109
The second approach-to minimize government intervention by
confining antitrust to narrow efficiency goals-is a strategy rather
than a theory. Commitment to the autonomy principle may reflect the
political philosophy of the libertarian," 0 or a less sweeping political
preference for allocating more discretionary power to private business
and less to government or private enforcers. It may reflect political
disagreement with the socio-political goals of antitrust, or a preference
for limiting judicial discretion."' It may stem from ajudgment that a
need to muster American economic and political strength in the world
overshadows the economic or political contributions of antitrust. Or it
may signify merely the private interest of the business person in freer
rein or greater profits.
The autonomy approach to antitrust cannot be carried to the
extreme or it would trump the law. Therefore, even those who favor
autonomy must make a concession to antitrust. A minimal concession
is recognition of the output theory, limited by assumptions that reflect
a faith in the free market to reward efficiency, to remove inefficiency,
and to punish exploitation.1 12
109 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 13; F. SCHERER, supra note 46. Consumer interests
require, particularly, that acts of dominant and leading firms in concentrated markets be
scrutinized and possibly restrained. Id. See also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
11 See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67. Economic libertarianism, particularly when carried to
its extreme, is incompatible with antitrust. "Liberty" for big business cannot fairly be classi-
fied as a value than underlies existing antitrust legislation. Rather, libertarianism argues
against antitrust statutes. See, e.g., Demsetz, The Trust Behind Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-
TRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 45; Brozen, No. . . The Concentration-Collu-
sion Doctrine, in id. at 90. See also Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 351
(1904): "But this Court has heretofore adjudged that. . . liberty of contract did not involve a
right to deprive the public of the advantages of free competition in trade and commerce."
. See R. BORK, supra 'note 13, at 82-83.
112 The assumptions include: business is motivated to achieve lowest cost of imputs and thus
to achieve greatest scale economies; resource loss from failure to achieve scale economies
almost always exceeds resource loss caused by deviation from marginal-cost pricing; competi-
tion is presumpt'vely dynamic and incentives to innovate are great, even if few firms occupy a
market; consumers are sovereign and firms must cater to their wishes to survive and achieve
success; markets function well and will quickly punish an exploitative or unresponsive pro-
ducer; resources move quickly to their highest and best use (what consumers want most); there
are no barriers to entry other than technology or government imposed restraints, and any
barriers that do exist are virtually always surmountable by the enterprising potential entrant;
finally, private business decisions almost always improve resource allocation, and even in the
exceptional case when behavior threatens a waste of resources, there is a thin line between
conduct that impairs and conduct that improves resource allocation.
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C. Preserving Competition as Process
The third and final conception of efficiency is the traditional
notion of competition as process. This conception does not presume to
define desired, efficient outcomes. It does not focus on consumer
surplus, marginal cost, or welfare loss. It centers, rather, on an
environment that is conducive to vigorous rivalry and in turn (it is
assumed), to efficiency and progressiveness.
Proponents of output-limitation theory and of autonomy theory
share the value of an environment conducive to rivalry. All seek a
dynamic market of efficient and flexible producers responsive to
changing conditions of scarcity and consumers' changing wants.
Those who stress competition process, however, reject the autonomy
principle as the means to the desired end, 'and they reject the output-
limitation formula as the exclusive or the central guide.
Thus far, this third conception describes an approach adopted by
diverse thinkers who may not share assumptions about the existence
or vulnerability of corporate power. 113 As this Article further defines
the approach, however, proponents of the refined conception do share
a series of assumptions and values that distinguish their frame of
reference. Proponents place value on diversity and pluralism. They
focus on preserving lower barriers to entry and greater opportunity for
entry and success of unestablished firms, more than on promoting
productive efficiency of established firms. They perceive that markets
are inherently imperfect; producers garner and keep market power for
reasons other than excellence in performance; consumers are often,
within bounds, at the mercy of producers; barriers to entry and
expansion in numerous markets are high and may be so maintained
by threats of discipline by dominant firms; the market is often slow to
discipline exploitative or marginally unresponsive established pro-
ducers; and the unknown new entrant, unhoned and untraditional, is
a vital source of new spirit and new progressiveness. Finally, unless
antitrust law and enforcement preserves an environment that keeps
markets open and fluid, private power will grow and will invite
intrusive and inefficient government regulation and control." 4
113 Compare Bock, Concentration: Issues, Convictions and Facts-Overview in INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-
TRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 167, with Sullivan, supra note 1.
114 As Dirlam and Kahn have written, "[this last purpose of preserving competition . . .
represent[s], paradoxically, a departure from laissez faire in the ultimate interests of laissez
faire." J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 17.
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VI
THE CHOICE AMONG EFFICIENCY APPROACHES
The three perspectives on efficiency are representative rather
than inclusive.i 5 They represent a range of choices for a perspective
on an efficient economy. The inquiry in this section is whether any
one perspective, more than others, appropriately informs antitrust
policy.
First, I treat the autonomy principle. One of two prevailing
contentions is that business, including business with market power,
should be free to do virtually all that it wishes on the theory that
business knows best how to please consumers and has the incentives to
do so. This contention is based on the assumption that business firms
are rational profit-maximizers-that their acts are always or virtually
always efficient. The assumption is vulnerable. Business managers
frequently act in order to realize personal goals, including political
power or personal security within their firms, as well as to build
empires."" Moreover, even as would-be profit-maximizers, man-
agers are limited by the absence of full information; they make deci-
sions on the basis of partial knowledge and intuition rather than full
rationality.ii1 Finally, pursuit of profit-maximizing goals by a firm
with market power is inconsistent with consumers' interests in optimal
output and price near costs 8"- interests that concerned the legisla-
tors far more than producers' profits or productive efficiency.i A
view of efficiency defined by business autonomy is, accordingly, inap-
propriate for antitrust.
The second correlation between efficiency and autonomy is based
upon political or personal desires to maximize autonomy rather than
efficiency. This political strategy obviously is not an appropriate basis
for antitrust economics, particularly because the political philosophy
15 Other perspectives on efficiency include theory based on the experience curve, a perspec-
tive that views monopoly in a specialized niche as a means to greatest efficiency, and a
perspective that is based on preserving the competition process but is not further defined by
assumptions that credit the existence of corporate power. For the experience curve perspective,
see B. HENDERSON, ON CORPORATE STRATEGY (1979); Shapiro, Corporate Strategy and Antitrust
Policy: The Experience Curve Model, in SHIFTING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN REGULATION AND COMPETI-
TION: CRITERIA FOR AN ENTERPRISE SYSTEM AND THE EXPERIENCE CURVE MODEL, THE CONFER-
ENCE BOARD, Info. Bull. No. 77, at 11 (1980). For a perspective on the competition process, see
Bock, Concentration: Issues, Convictions and Facts- Overview in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND
THE MARKET SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 167.
11 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS,
ch. 2 (1975); F. Scherer, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Sept. 23, 1981.
117 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 116.
118 See section V supra.
Il9 See section III supra.
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of antitrust (distrust of power) is at war with the philosophy that
accords free rein to business.
Advocates of autonomy theory combine political and economic
concerns in their protest against government intervention in the con-
text of international competition. They charge that antitrust handi-
caps American competitors in their quest for both efficiency 120 and
power, 12 1 and suggest, as an antidote, autonomy. In fact, antitrust
law interferes very little with courses of action that an American firm
may wish to take in attempts to produce or distribute its products
abroad more efficiently. 122  Antitrust does constrain the growth of
12' This idea is not new to the twentieth century. See Argument ofJames C. Carter for the
Joint Traffic Association, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 513 (1898), in
support of the railroads' claim of right to fix "reasonable" prices:
[S]ensible legislators for the most part understood very clearly that the things
complained of were but the necessary incidents and consequences of the progress of
industry and civilization and could not be arrested without checking the advance of
the nation and crippling it in the fierce competitions with other nations, and that
any useful effort to remedy the supposed evils must be directed against the abuses
of the power of aggregated capital and not at the aggregations themselves.
121 See Large, General Counsel, United Technologies Corp., Merger Mini-Program,
Emerging Issues with Respect to Merger Enforcement Standards, ABA Antitrust Section
Annual Meeting, August 1979. Large asserts that the antitrust laws should not interfere with
an American firm's acquisition of leverage and market power if "it is going to give me some
more muscle so I can stay in there with my bigger competition [in international markets]." 48
ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 1655-56 (1979).
American business managers and policy makers sometimes extol the Japanese system
because of the special help it offers to its nationals. The Japanese government works in
cooperation with business, encourages ventures in growing markets, and allocates and coordi-
nates investment and production opportunities. See Taber, supra note 9, at 52; Note, Trustbust-
ing in Japan: Cartels and Government-Business Cooperation, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1064 (1981). The
Japanese government also works in cooperation with declining industry. With businesses in
declining industry, it derives plans as to who shall shut down how many plants and when. See
Stokes, Can Japan's Aid to its Industry Guide U.S.?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1980, at Dl, col. 3.
The Japanese system of business/government decisionmaking by consensus appears to have
worked well for Japan in the last several years, at least in high-technology industries. It is not
obvious, however, that government/business cooperation in basic resource allocation decisions
would work well for the United States, or indeed that the Federal Government is better
equipped than American business to decide where, when, and how much to invest.
12 Antitrust is compatible with firms' efforts to save costs in production and distribution.
See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (titanium dioxide), [1980] 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 21,770 (FTC).
Only if one interprets success in foreign markets as requiring power and leverage in
domestic markets can one bring aspirations of American firms for success in world markets into
conflict with domestic antitrust policy.
Although muscle to compete abroad is not a recognized goal of antitrust, the United States
government has been sensitive to claims by American firms that they are handicapped in their
competition abroad. It has made strides both to clarify the permissiveness of the law with
respect to foreign transactions, and to ease the entry of domestic firms into foreign markets. See,
e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, Jan. 26, 1977, reprinted in B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE AcQUIsI-
TIONS AND MERGERS, app. 15 (1981). See also Farnsworth, supra note 9, at D2, col. 1.
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domestic power by means other than competition on the merits. If the
claim is that American antitrust stands in the way of productive
enterprise, it is contrary to fact. If the claim is that American antitrust
stands in the way of market power that may be useful in the competi-
tive race abroad, then the concern could support proposals for revision
or partial repeal of the antitrust laws. It could not, however, fairly
inform a definition of efficiency.
Second, should output limitation theory be the antitrust measure
of efficiency? The measurement of a firm's ability and incentives to
limit output does have a relationship to the consumer concerns of the
antitrust laws, although more because of the distributive effect of
raising price to consumers and the political effect of limiting freedom
of choice than the allocative effect of wasting resources.
Where economic analysis indicates that identified behavior, such
as a merger or distribution system, will lead to output restrictions by
the producers in the market, the behavior is likely to restrain trade
and harm the consumer interests identified above, and to be illegal
under traditional antitrust principles. 123  Therefore, the economists'
yardstick that measures output limitation is a helpful tool. 124
123 On the other hand, a monopoly or oligopoly that can be shown to restrict output is not
for that reason illegal. There is no law against oligopoly or monopoly; nor is there a law against
unilateral output restriction or monopoly pricing. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Nonetheless, evidence of
power to restrict output is relevant to alleged use of power in a manner that the law reprehends.
124 The economic measurement of impairment of social welfare is highly theoretical and is
based on assumptions that are likely to suffer from a wide range of error. First, the conclusions
of any given economic exercise can tell us no more than what the economists purport to
measure. The economists wish to measure the extent to which all resources in society are
allocated to their best use in light of consumer demand, given the distribution of wealth.
Because the enormity of such an endeavor surpasses the ability and perhaps even the imagina-
tion of the individual, economists limit their task. They attempt to measure whether more or
fewer resources should be allocated to given markets in view of the supposed aggregate
consumer demand for an existing product if the product were sold at cost (including a return
sufficient to attract the necessary capital into the market). If producers are providing the output
necessary to satisfy the consumer demand that would exist if all products were sold at cost,
social welfare is deemed maximized. It is not relevant whether the producer actually sells the
product at cost.
Dr. Eugene Singer, an economist, has put the welfare calculations into perspective. He
notes that economists are presented "with insuperable difficulties because of the incomparabil-
ity of the utilities of different individuals. There is no economic or objective solution for finding
a 'bliss point' which maximizes the satisfaction of consumers." E. SINGER, ANTITRUST Eco-
NOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 3 (1981). Economists ignore the difficulty and purport to solve the
problem with a single answer as to what is "optimal." As Singer observes:
The term "optimal" for the classical economist implied merely that the supply-
and-demand equation for the economic model could be solved within their theoreti-
cal framework. It did not purport to indicate that consumers would be happy or
satisfied with their level of income, standard of living, or the quality of goods and
services distributed in their economy.
Id.at 2 (footnote omitted).
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The theory of output limitation assumes that if producers are
induced to offer the quantity of output that consumers are willing to
buy at a price compensatory to the producers, consumer interests in a
competitive marketplace are exhausted. 5 That assumption is not
compatible with the antitrust laws. Output theory is narrow and
static. It fails to reflect producers' potential to achieve lower costs or to
deliver the new, the imaginative, and the yet unconceived.1 26  It fails
to consider opportunities for reversing an anticompetitive trend or for
In addition to the misleading generalization of consumers' preferences, and the mislead-
ing implication that use of antitrust to maximize consumer welfare will make consumers
happier, the economists' calculations depend upon many doubtful assumptions. They assume
that all demand curves slope downwards (as price falls, demand and output increase), that all
producers are rational profit-maximizers, that all consumers are rational utility-maximizers,
and that consumers are sovereign. They assume that the market is static; as one variable
changes, all else remains the same (certerisparibus). They take producer costs as given and make
assumptions as to the reasonable rate of return to attract capital. For critical questioning of the
validity of some of these assumptions, see, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 116; Flynn, The
Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, and Appendix: Definitions and Assumptions of
Economic Analysis, 12 Sw. U.L. Rzv. 335, 361 (1981); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 456 (1974). Professor Leff writes:
Now it must immediately be noted, and never forgotten, that these basic
propositions [on demand curves and producer and consumer rationality] are really
not empirical propositions at all. They are all generated by "reflection" on an
"assumption" about choice under scarcity and rational maximization. While
Posner states that "there is abundant evidence that theories derived from those
assumptions have considerable power in predicting how people in fact behave," he
cites none.
Id. at 457.
Moreover, this economic approach could present insuperable burdens for an enforcer. As
to business firms' range of discretion in calculating profits, see E. SINGER, supra, at 7. As to
power of firms to manipulate costs, see Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F.
Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (by allocating fixed costs in proportion to sales revenues, IBM
could engage in low-price competition against a new entrant without falling below marginal
cost; every time it dropped its price, it automatically lowered its allocated costs).
125 Professor Warren Schwartz asserts that the only reason that consumer damage actions
focus on the overcharge (i.e., the distributive consequences) depicted by the wealth-transfer
rectangle, see text at note 92 supra, is "the empirical difficulty" in identifying the victims of the
harm reflected by the welfare triangle. W. Schwartz, supra note 91, at 1084.
To the contrary, the reason why consumer damage actions focus on the wealth transfer
and not the welfare triangle is that Congress cared centrally about the distributive effect.
Congress was concerned with business' profiteering at the expense of the consumer. See note *
supra. As the Supreme Court correctly observed in upholding the right of a consumer to
damages for overcharge, "[c]ertainly the leading proponents of the legislation perceived the
treble-damages remedy of what is now § 4 as a means of protecting consumers from over-
charges resulting from price-fixing." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
Thus, the antitrust laws do incorporate distributional and other equity values. Recognition of
this reality destroys the basic premise of those who claim that antitrust has allocative purposes
only.
126 See generally W. BAXTER, P. COOTNER & K. ScoTT, supra note 86. Baxter, Cootner, and
Scott identify resource loss caused by impairment of the incentive to innovate as one of the two
types of social loss from decreased competition. The other loss is the static dead weight loss.
They argue persuasively that loss of potential innovation is likely to be far more important than
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inviting untested competition at the margins. It fails to capture indi-
viduality of producers and consumers or to grasp the dynamic quali-
ties of an open enterprise system. 127
The point is not that welfare economics ignores strategic behavior
and long-run effects. Some economists do, and some do not. 12  The
point is that all welfare analysis is narrowly confined to one question:
Will producers limit output and thereby "waste" society's resources?
This is not the central question of antitrust. 12 9
Finally, should efficiency as a goal of antitrust be conceived in
terms of protection of the competition process? This Article contends
that protecting the process of competition among a significant number
of rivals in free and open markets, with special regard for long-run
failure to realize all significant scale economies, because technological change may cause costs
to fall at every level of scale. Id.at 84-86. Baxter, Cootner, and Scott suggest a method for
taking into account incentives to invent and for regarding "technological change. . . as being
fully as important as [dead weight loss and scale economies]." Id. at 86 (discussing the
electronic funds transfer market).
12' Professors Dirlam and Kahn comment on the limits of output theory as follows:
The only alternatives customers know are those that have been presented to them
by the same accustomed patterns of business structure and behavior. Here public
policy may defy the economists. The latter have shown a tendency in recent years
to worry only about the power that is a power to increase prices; but there are other
forms of economic power about which the community may legitimately be con-
cerned. Economists have also shown a strong tendency to define welfare in terms of
efficiency in doing accustomed things in an accustomed way, to define competition
in terms of the forms it takes today, and to insist that those are the only possible
goals, practices, and forms even though the community may find some of them
socially unacceptable.
J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 14.
In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Court, by Justice
Brennan, likewise identified economic goals and concerns not captured by output theory:
At the price of some repetition, we note that if the businessman is denied credit
because his banking alternatives have been eliminated by mergers, the whole
edifice of an entrepreneurial system is threatened; if the costs of banking services
and credit are allowed to become excessive by the absence of competitive pressures,
virtually all costs, in our credit economy, will be affected; and unless competition is
allowed to fulfill its role as an economic regulator in the banking industry, the
result may well be even more governmental regulation.
Id. at 372.
128 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF EcONOMIcs, BUREAU OF COMPETITION,
STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (S. Salop ed. 1981).
129 See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941):
Petitioners.. . argue that the combination cannot be contrary to the policy of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, since the Federal Trade Commission did not find
that the combination fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production,
or brought about a deterioration in quality. But action falling into these three
categories does not exhaust the types of conduct banned by the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.
A recent expression of the view "that the antitrust laws were designed to protect competi-
tion, not solely to improve allocative efficiency," appears in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,229, at 73,909 (9th Cir. 1981).
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consumer interests, 130 is the most appropriate focus for antitrust eco-
nomics.
I do not claim that protection of the process is the only means or
the obviously superior route to greatest efficiency or happiest con-
sumers. None of the perspectives on antitrust and efficiency can fairly
present itself as the one right answer, in terms of greatest efficiency
alone. All of the perspectives rely on assumptions and even articles of
faith. I make, rather, a limited claim: The traditional antitrust focus
on process, revised to eliminate any tilt towards small size for its own
sake, should be retained for historical, social, and pragmatic reasons.
First, this perspective has worked reasonably well in keeping markets
open to competition on the merits and thus to creating an environ-
ment conducive to efficient performance; no other system promises to
work better. Second, it is rooted in tradition, which produces continu-
ity and thus relative certainty in enforcement of and compliance with
the antitrust rule of law. Third, it is the one accepted economic
,perspective that harmonizes with the dominant non-efficiency values
of antitrust. Finally, although reaffirmation of the traditional focus
-does involve some selection among economic modes of thinking, this
focus has been deeply ingrained in antitrust for nearly a century, and
it provides an open and flexible framework that does not lock the law
into a closed, theoretical, economic construct.
Critics would abandon tradition and embrace either theoretical
welfare economics or producer autonomy on grounds that the system
fails to take sufficient account of the interests of American consumers
in lower prices and better products, the interests of American pro-
ducers in excelling in world markets, and a national political interest
in reestablishing America as the major economic power in the world.
The critics' argument rests on the view that antitrust protects
inefficiencies and aborts transactions that capture cost-savings and
"'0 For purposes of the limiting principle, antitrust enforcement is deemed harmful to
consumer interests if enforcement deprives consumers or intermediate buyers of lower priced
options or prevents business activity that is reasonably necessary or important to get goods or
services to market. Antitrust enforcement is not regarded as harming consumer interests
merely because it prevents producers from realizing a profit opportunity and thereby frees
some resources for an alternative use. Many economists argue that such lost benefits constitute
a serious welfare loss to society and that the antitrust laws should not be applied when a net
welfare loss is threatened. E.g., W. BAXTER, P. COOTNER & K. ScoTT, supra note 86. In
contrast, this Article argues that such a supposed welfare loss cannot be added to the concerns
of antitrust without eroding antitrust; that calculations of such a loss are illusory because they
may be offset by technology gains developed by any one of a number of significant rivals; that
resource waste from regulatory laws dwarfs the possible resource loss from antitrust enforce-
ment; and finally, aware that some otherwise unnecessary use of resources is inherent in a
competition system, we nonetheless have chosen such a system.
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thereby harms the consumer, impedes the producer, and weakens the
economic performance of American firms. The criticism has a genesis
in rigidities in the law implanted by Supreme Court opinions of the
1960s and early 1970s. These opinions glorified small size and they
created inflexible per se rules, which may have diverted efficient
activity. The criticism, however, does not lead inexorably to a pro-
posal to discard traditional focus on process. 131 Rather, it supports a
plan for the modernization of antitrust through change at the mar-
gins. It supports a design to build into the system a proper regard for
long-run consumer interests and a proper respect for producer auton-
omy. Such change is in progress.
VII
THE PLACE -OF EFFICIENCY IN THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
A. Introduction
This section examines whether efficiency should be the only value
that informs antitrust law, and, if not, what other values should be
incorporated and in what ways. An array of scholars has examined the
place of efficiency in the scheme of antitrust. They have offered a
variety of proposals. I first present a representative spectrum of ap-
proaches taken by individuals who have thought deeply about the
problem. I do so both to demonstrate the variety of perspectives and
to suggest possibilities for resolution.
Professor Bork argues that antitrust does and should exist only to
promote efficiency and thus enhance consumer welfare. He argues
that irrational, careless, or biased Justices have diverted the law from
this one, clear goal.' 32 Although Professor Bork insists that he would
131 Overhauling the existing antitrust system would itself produce inefficiency. See McChes-
ney, On the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1103 (1980). McChesney writes:
Businessmen could not know (even if lawyers and economists were sure) which
sorts of structure, conduct, and performance ultimately would be deemed efficient
and therefore legal. For this reason, the sudden adoption of an efficiency criterion
might only create inefficiency, the uncertainty costs swamping the benefits of
change.
Id. at 1104 (footnote omitted). McChesney observes that if antitrust principles frustrate certain
efficient behavior, producers and consumers will adapt to the rules by substituting legal
behavior that is efficient. For example, a business might form a legal joint venture to accom-
plish what could not legally have been done by merger. "Consequently, the gains from altering
the existing law often diminish over time as substitutes for inefficient rules are discovered and
employed." Id. at 1105 n.12.
132 R. BORK, supra note 13, at 108-09.
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apply antitrust only to advance consumer welfare, the assertion may
mislead, for Professor Bork does not use the expression "consumer
welfare" as welfare economics defines that phrase. Bork proclaims
that what is good for big business is good for the consumer, and his
solution is to give maximum autonomy to private business. 133
Professor Posner argues that antitrust does and should exist only
to promote efficiency and thus maximize the wealth of the nation. He
regards collusion among competitors in concentrated markets as the
only real obstacle to wealth-maximization, and he would use antitrust
solely to prevent collusion of oligopolists.'
34
Professors Areeda and Turner likewise would limit antitrust to
their concept of efficiency and progressiveness. They regard the con-
sumer as the one intended beneficiary of efficiency. They worry about
persistent noncompetitive market structures and aim to enhance com-
petition and promote consumer interests over the long run, 135 al-
though sometimes they accept a short-run view as the best proxy for
the long run. 13' They take a more open view of consumer interests
than does Posner and generally do not limit themselves to theoretical,
static models. Faced with the choice between protecting a monopoly
firm's incentives to innovate and protecting smaller competitors' op-
portunities to compete, however, they opt for the former on the theory
or instinct that their choice best serves consumers. 137
133 See id. at 90-98. Professor Gellhorn reveals the normativejudgments inherent in Professor
Bork's approach:
What Bork seems to have implicitly conceded by his proposed horizontal
merger rule, then, is that efficiency cannot always be the only standard and that in
developing policy where economic theory and data are uncertain some assumptions
may have to be made and some legal presumptions may be usefully employed.
... What normative values did he rely on to reach his judgment [that mergers
up to 60 or 70 percent of the market should be permitted? T]o do nothing now is to
make a policy decision and suggests to me that Bork's proposed rule is aimed at
preserving a semblance of the status quo pending further data.
Gellhorn, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1376, 1387-88 (1979) (reviewing R. BORk, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX).
13 R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 39-77, 212.
135 See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, chs. 1, 4.
13' Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697, 706-07 (1975); see Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment,
89 HARV. L. REv. 868 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REv.
901 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284
(1977); Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing I, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979). But see Areeda
& Turner, Predatory Pricing: A Rdoinder, 88 YALE LJ. 1641 (1979); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on
Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REv. 891 (1976).
137 See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, 626(b), 706(b), 722; Turner, Technological
Innovations By a Dominant Firm, in ANTITRUST: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 80's (Fourteenth New
England Antitrust Conference, Mass. CLE-N. Eng. Law Institute, Inc. 1980).
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Professor Sullivan takes a multivalued view of antitrust. He re-
spects efficiency, and he respects the variety of interests of consumers,
including the distributive effects of bringing price toward costs. 13
Professor Sullivan's "eclectic" view of antitrust rests on consumer
concerns, humanistic concerns, the distrust of power, and the de-
mands of the common law tradition to impose order on chaos. 39
Other scholars warn that efficiency should not eclipse dominant
non-economic goals of antitrust. The same individuals, however, are
convinced that enforcement of antitrust to decentralize power and to
promote justice will benefit the consumer and tend to increase the
satisfaction of individuals in society. Professor Louis Schwartz has
documented the ways in which certain antitrust laws and related
legislation and government action were designed "to create alterna-
tive centers of power that could not readily be marshalled behind
authoritarian regimes," and to promote " 'justice,' in the sense of
fair and equal treatment of persons in like situations." 140  Professor
Flynn has challenged formulas for efficiency as delusive and mislead-
ing; they are, he argues, shallow measurements of what can be mea-
sured only because what should be measured defies measurement.' 4 1
This Article rejects the view that antitrust should be confined to
efficiency objectives. That view runs counter to the language of the
statutes, to the history of those statutes, and to the developed deci-
sional law. If it is feasible, antitrust should reflect in a meaningful way
13 See Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 10 (1980); Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of
Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 332
(1979).
Professor Sullivan would place qualified reliance on economics. He would not rely on
static price theory as the tool to derive solutions to antitrust problems. Nor does he believe that
efficient resource allocation is or should be the goal of antitrust. He asserts:
Thinking and writing about the law as though rational resource allocation were the
only goal can only lead to confusion.
• . . Antitrust, indeed, is founded on a populist tradition, a tradition quite at
odds with the scientific rationality that informs economic theory [.1 . . . [T]hat
tradition . . . makes its own legitimate claim on judicial attention and, viewed
quite pragmatically, has its effects on the developing law which the lawyer cannot
ignore even if the economist can or must.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 11.
131 L. SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 10-11.
140 L. Schwartz, 'Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 1078.
141 Flynn, supra note 124. Professors Schwartz and Flynn see antitrust as a body of law
designed to promote economic justice, fairness, and opportunity. Id.; L. Schwartz, On the Uses
of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Treatises, supra note 1; L. Schwartz, 'Justice" and Other
Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, supra note 1; L. Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual Liberty:
Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness, supra note 1.
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all of its basic goals, including power dispersion, competitive opportu-
nity, and long-run consumer satisfaction. The two strongest argu-
ments offered against incorporation of non-efficiency values are, first,
that any use of non-efficiency values tends to impair efficiency, and,
second, that the non-efficiency values cannot rationally be incorpo-
rated into relatively clear and reliable principles of antitrust law.
Proponents of the first claim regard virtually all business behav-
ior other than collusion among oligopolists as neutral or procompeti-
tive. They believe private investment decisions tend to maximize
allocative efficiency, and virtually any constraint that diverts the flow
of resources from the privately-conceived "best" use is destructive of
allocative efficiency. One who holds this perspective and who prefers
efficiency to all other antitrust values will resist incorporation of non-
efficiency values, as I have explained above. 142
The claim that non-efficiency values cannot be rationally incor-
porated into law is weak. The burden of the following section is that:
(1) Non-efficiency values are already incorporated into antitrust prin-
ciples in measureable ways, although there has been some flux in
recent years as the law moves to a new equilibrium. (2) An attempt to
wrench the non-efficiency values out of the antitrust law after nearly a
century of integration would be much more destructive to the anti-
trust rule of law than would a continued respect for stare decisis with
changes at the margin to protect consumers' interests. (3) There is an
appropriate framework for analysis to aid the movement toward the
new equilibrium.
B. An Approach
The framework for the new equilibrium requires a synthesis of
four concepts: (1) the centrality of the competition process; (2) the use
of economics to promote the competition process; (3) the harmonious
integration of converging efficiency and non-efficiency goals; and (4)
use of consumers' interests as a trump over goals that conflict.
The central component of this synthesizing view is the competi-
tion process. The process presupposes dynamic interaction among
firms that are both flexible and adaptable to changing desires and
needs. It presupposes an environment conducive to entry, survival,
and success. 143 Of more importance, this conception rejects the as-
142 See text at section VI supra.
143 See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12; B. KLEIN, supra note 72.
The competition fostered by antitrust law has strong roots in a notion of freedom of trade.
If every trader's freedom is preserved, then the flexibility of each trader to meet consumer
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sumption that, absent government interference, competition is virtu-
ally always robust and the best will win. It operates on the assumption
that established firms tend to garner the power to place roadblocks
before their competitors and to perpetuate success for reasons other
than merits. For this reason, the concept focuses on preserving oppor-
tunities at the margin for firms without market power, more than
promoting opportunities for cost-savings for firms with market
power, 144 but it facilitates both.
Given this context, we must define the linkage between effi-
ciency, economics, and antitrust policy. "Efficiency" is not an ulti-
mate goal. It is an intermediate goal pursued in order to facilitate
freedom of choice, to serve other interests of consumers, and to make
the best use of society's resources. Economics provides useful tools to
achieve solutions that promote or harmonize with efficiency.
Efficiency frequently corresponds directly with promotion of the
competition process and with developed antitrust case law. The corre-
lation is particularly clear in the law directed against the growth, use,
and effects of market power. 145  The tools of economics can be em-
ployed most usefully in such cases. For example, economic analysis
can appropriately be used as a guide and as supporting authority in
cases challenging monopolization and attempts to monopolize, 146 oli-
wants in its own way is maximized, and the public gets "whatever advantage may be derived
from competition in the subsequent traffic." Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911); see United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972);
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
It is seldom clear beforehand what this freedom will bring. But the theory of free
competition does not demand proof that long-term gains will exceed short-term losses. Rather,
it carries the presumption that competition is in the public interest and will advance the public
good. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949).
The Supreme Court has drawn an analogy between free competition and free speech. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976). The law protecting speech does not promote good speech and bottle up bad speech.
Rather, it facilitates the flow of speech. It focuses concern on process, not outcome, with the
conviction that process is vital in its own right, that its protection will bring about the most
acceptable and desirable results, and that the process is self-correcting in the long run.
144 Like democracy, competition is a process designed to aid no one in particular. It does not
promote any set of subjective moral values except those values that put the process in place. It
will sometimes have harsh results, but, on balance, compared with the alternatives, it best
promotes the public good. Cf. J. ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
The antitrust process would not favor small businesses, although inefficient, for moral
reasons. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). Nor would it
protect monopoly, although inefficient, for moral reasons.
145 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 (1962);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
146 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12; R. POSNER, supra note 13; F. SCHERER, supra
note 46.
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gopolists' collusion, 147 mergers that threaten to create power over
price and output, 148 and manufacturers' restraints on resellers' cus-
tomers and territories.
149
In other areas, rights and principles that have a less obvious
connection with consumer benefit are deeply embedded in antitrust
law and- heritage. This category includes many mergers prohibited by
the merger law. 150 It includes applications of the per se rule against
tying arrangements, 151 classic group boycotts of single victims, 152 ver-
tical price-fixing, 153 horizontal price-fixing in fragmented markets,
154
and market divisions among small firms. 155 The category promi-
nently includes the access cases, which give firms a limited right of
access to scarce but vital facilities and sources of supply' 56 and a right
147 We can and should learn from economics; which could, for example, advance the law's
capability of dealing with oligopolistic interdependence. See Nye, Can Conduct-Oriented Enforce-
ment Inhibit Conscious Parallelism?, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (Mar. 4, 1975);
Shenefield, Antitrust Division Memorandum on Identification and Challenge of Parallel Pricing Practices in
Concentrated Industries, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (July 27, 1978).
14' 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, Supra note 12; R. POSNER, supra note 13; F. SCHERER, supra
note 46.
149 In the area of distributional restraints, the Supreme Court moved from a business
freedom principle to an efficiency principle in 1977. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Justice White stated in concurrence:
[W]hile according some weight to the businessman's interest in controlling the
terms on which he trades in his own goods may be anathema to those who view the
Sherman Act as directed solely to economic efficiency, this principle is without
question more deeply embedded in our cases than the notion of "free rider" effects
and distributional efficiencies borrowed by the majority from the "new economics
of vertical relationships."
Id. at 68-69 (footnote omitted).
I accept the outcome of the GTE Sylvania case and its overruling of Schwinn's broad and
absolutist free-trader principle as a starting point for my proposal. The holding of GTE Sylvania
is correct because, in that case, per se application of the antitrust laws against Sylvania would
have deprived a firm without market power of basic distributional efficiencies, and thus would
have deprived the consumer of a more effective competitor.
1'o See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 76, at 596-97.
"I See International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
152 In Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a boycott against a
retail competitor was held illegal per se, although it was conceded that there was no harm to
competition. The Solicitor General argued, in the amicus brief of the United States in favor of
plaintiff Klor's, that the antitrust laws protect a victim against a group boycott even if the
injury to the victim's competitive position does not cause "other measurable injuries to the
public interest." Brief for the United States at 8, Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
15 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
194 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
155 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
16 The right is subject to a business justification defense. For example, a producer would
not ordinarily have a duty to grant access if its facilities cannot accommodate another user. Cf.
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not to be fenced out of any substantial market by the leverage of a
better situated competitor.157
The bases of these rights are varied. They reflect concerns for
fairness, opportunity, and autonomy for sellers without power. They
reflect also the concern that individuals in a democratic society should
be relatively free from great aggregations of power, lest those centers
of power, however benign and progressive today, exploit them eco-
nomically or control them politically tomorrow. Moreover, every one
of these rights has a connection with an interest of consumers,5 8 even
though that connection would be disputed by those who believe that
the market always rewards merit. Each one of the principles fits into a
vision of a free and open market, wherein opportunity for producers
without power correlates with interests of consumers in diversity,
choice, and the new invention by the maverick who may revolutionize
the industry.
I make the following proposal. Antitrust should serve consumers'
interests and should also serve other, established, non-conflicting ob-
jectives. There are four major historical goals of antitrust, and all
should continue to be respected. These are: (1) dispersion of economic
power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits, (3)
satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the competition
process as market governor. A fifth possible goal of antitrust is the
preservation of small size for its own sake. Because of the unusual
potential for conflict between this objective and consumers' interests,
I do not propose incorporation of this goal into antitrust policy. A
sixth possible goal, justice, is vague in conception and is in fact a
by-product of several more specific goals. I therefore do not treat this
value separately.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
'7 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 575 (1972), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 407
(D. Mich. 1968), holding Ford's acquisitions of assets of a major spark plug manufacturer
illegal. The district court observed, "[W]hat hurts is that the opportunity to try [to supply
Ford's needs] has been taken away." 286 F. Supp. at 442 (footnote omitted). See also FTC v.
Texaco, Inc. 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
323-24 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); International Salt
Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
158 For example, the principle against tie-ins may keep entry barriers lower and thereby
facilitate checks on market power in concentrated markets.
The fact that an antitrust principle may produce efficiency benefits does not mean that
efficiency is the center of antitrust policy. It merely reinforces the premise that efficiency is one
df the probable results of preservation of the competition process.
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My proposal is that when developed principles of antitrust serve
one of the four basic historical goals of antitrust and do not threaten
increased costs to consumers over the long run, stare decisis should be
respected by the courts. 5 9 However, long-run consumer interests
should be a limiting principle. Antitrust should not be applied in ways
likely to harm consumers over the long run.16 0
In cases of hard-core violations, such as horizontal price-fixing
and market divisions, the limiting principle would not come into play.
Freedom to decide what and how much to produce, and where, to
whom,1 61 and at what price to sell, is central to the nervous system of
markets and therefore to long-run consumers' interests. No defense of
151 If each principle of antitrust law were reexamined and reshaped to advance economists'
views of efficiency, then all antitrust cases would tend to rise to the complexity of monopoly
cases. Particularly when developed antitrust law is based on sound policy consistent with the
goals underlying the law and not obviously inconsistent with long-run consumer interests, it
would be unwise to invite the battles of economic experts.
See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEw OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1979) regarding the complexity of the
monopoly case. See also Loescher, Limiting Corporate Power, 13 J. OF EcON. ISSUES 557 (1979),
warning of problems of both bias and attenuation inherent in litigating the question of firm
efficiencies:
Available comparative cost and performance data are notoriously unobjective, for
most are provided by the very firms.to be dissolved. Frank Kottke warns us that
defendant firms probably will selectively control the release of information in a
partisan fashion, while Oliver Williamson reminds us that such vigorously partisan
behavior is fully legitimated by the advocacy process.
Id.at 558 (footnotes omitted).
160 By this standard, I would disapprove of the language, and therefore, in part, the result,
of Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In Brown Shoe, Chief Justice
Warren addressed the cost-saving aspects of the vertical integration of a shoe manufacturer and
retailer:
[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned business. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.
Id. at 344.
Chief Justice Warren's language is faithful to the legislative history. In light of the
language of the statute, however, which is phrased in terms of "competition" and not
decentralization, and in light of the need to protect consumers against increased costs, the
broad sweep of the language is no longer acceptable.
"61 The freedom to decide where and to whom to sell is, of course, qualified in the case of
vertical relationships by the principles set forth in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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efficiency would be allowed. So, too, there would be no change in the
established per se rule against classic group boycotts, which protects
economic opportunity and freedom to compete on the merits, because
enforcement of the rule causes no harm to consumers.
Other per se principles could be candidates for challenge as
inconsistent with consumer interests. These include the rules of law
that prohibit maximum vertical price-fixing, minimum vertical price-
fixing, especially in fragmented markets by producers without market
power, and tying arrangements in which the tie does not endanger
price or quality of the goods in the market for the tied product. A
successful challenger would be required to demonstrate that applica-
tion of the per se rule harms long-run consumer interests viewed from
a perspective harmonious with the proposed conception of competi-
tion process. For example, if composers of music must pool their
compositions in order to provide an efficient system of delivery to
broadcast users, per se invalidity would impose obvious harm on
buyers and would thus be unacceptable.' Therefore, if existing
interpretations characterized such pooling of product by competitors
as per se illegal, those interpretations would be overturned.
Imposition of such a burden on one who wishes to challenge
established law is appropriate because the current prohibitions of the
law serve traditional antitrust values apart from deterrence of monop-
olies and cartels. For example, the per se rule against certain tie-ins
reflects the value that producers should not be deprived of the right to
compete on the merits for any significant amount of business, as well
as the value of consumer choice. The per se rule against vertical
price-fixing reflects the value that sellers of goods should have the
freedom to charge the price they see fit, 6 a as well as the broader
economic judgment that markets work better when the individuals
closest to the pulse of the market transaction have the flexibility to
determine price.
Moreover, virtually all of the per se rules reflect a perceived need
for a prophylactic effect. Even consumer-based per se rules are more
inclusive than necessary to protect consumers against clearly anticom-
petitive conduct. The breadth of the rules is commonly justifiable by
their deterrent force, their contribution to the efficiency of enforce-
ment, and their contribution to the efficiency of business decisionmak-
M See discussion of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), in note 183
infra.
1'3 But cf Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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ing geared toward compliance. Accordingly, my proposal would re-
tain a per se rule against behavior in clearly defined categories where
(1) it is difficult to distinguish between restraints in the category that
are anticompetitive and threaten harm to consumers, and those that
are neutral or potentially beneficial; (2) it is important to prohibit and
effectively deter the harmful restraints; and (3) there is little likelihood
of loss to buyers of the product in question from overdeterrence. The
flat prohibition against all cartel activities, even those such as speciali-
zation agreements that could save resources, falls within this charac-
terization.
In the case of activity not per se illegal under existing law,
evidence of efficiency currently comes into the litigation, usually to
support a defendant's claims that the challenged activity does or will
improve its performance, render the market more competitive, and
benefit consumers. The limiting principle concerns the weight and
respect to be given to the evidence of efficiency. Courts do and should
take seriously credible evidence that particular antitrust enforcement
is likely to lead to the long-run detriment of users of the product in
question. If enforcement would deprive consumers of the benefits of
competition, such as the benefit of an important consumer option,16 4
the defendant should prevail.
Within a broad area, consumer and non-consumer values are
compatible and mutually reinforcing, and I conceive of the limiting
principle not as a harbinger of a rewritten law but as a safety valve to
guarantee sufficient flexibility to protect consumers from unnecessar-
ily increased costs or decreased options. In the following paragraphs,
to demonstrate the high degree of harmony of values, I describe and
suggest appropriate integration of the non-efficiency aspects of power
dispersion and opportunity.1 6 5
1. Power Dispersion and Consumer Interests
Power dispersion has particular relevance in monopoly cases
under section 2 of the Sherman Act and merger cases under section 7
164 On remand in the Sylvania case, for example, the court found that Sylvania's location
clause improved Sylvania's effectiveness and increased interbrand competition. Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Thus, enforcement
would have deprived consumers of the benefits of competition.
'6- These objectives have inseparable economic components. By one accepted economic
perspective, dispersion of economic power and preservation of freedom and incentives to enter
and succeed in markets best serve consumers in the long run. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note
46. See also J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, supra note 6; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 76; B.
KLEIN, supra note 72.
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of the Clayton Act. For purposes of the monopoly law, power disper-
sion as a socio-political goal coincides with efficiency and other con-
sumer concerns. 166 Consumer interests, like the nonconsumer social
concerns, lie against monopoly prices and favor greater output and
diversity of products and sources. The non-economic concern is not a
conflicting political value to be reckoned with. It neither requires nor
contemplates atomization of a monopolist into units too small to
achieve economies of scale. It does not mandate break-ups where the
forces of competition can be introduced through less drastic means.
Like the consumer concern, the socio-political values tend to favor
dissipation of substantial, persistent monopoly, but not in ways that
harm the consumer.
The dilemma in monopoly law comes not from a conflict between
the economic and non-economic goals of antitrust, but from very
different tensions. A tension exists between equity for the good mo-
nopolist and efficiency for the consumer. There is tension between
consumer interest against dead weight loss in a particular market and
general consumer interest in preservation of incentives to business to
strive to be the best. In addition, there is hesitancy to interfere with a
system that works, for a predicted but not certain consumer gain.
Given these tensions and uncertainties, the monopoly law has been
molded more by notions of fairness (to the good monopolist) than by
either economics or populism. The culpable monopolist is subject to
break-up without necessary inquiry into possible loss of efficiencies. 1
67
The monopolist that has not been culpable is legitimized. 18
How courts interpreting the monopoly law should account for the
potentially conflicting interests in low price, diversity of product and
source, and progressiveness is not free from doubt. Current law re-
spects freedom of a firm to grow to monopoly proportions and to
retain monopoly power achieved through competitive merits, in view
of the desire to preserve incentives to be the best and in spite of
possible monopoly pricing. The battleground centers on characteriza-
tion of behavior of a monopoly-sized firm as abusive or competitive.
The development of law in this area can and should be informed by
166 See Fox, Monopoly and Competition: Tilling the Law Towards a More Competitive Economy, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 49 (1980). See also Transcript of Hearings Before the National Commission for
the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Sept. 13, 1978, Oct. 17, 1978.
167 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968); United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
168 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Monopoly pricing is not deemed culpable, even though it is an
indicator of restricted output. Id.
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compatible notions of efficiency and diversity: a tilt at the margin
toward protecting opportunities for efficient challengers of the domi-
nant firm. 16
9
Merger law and power dispersion have a somewhat different
relationship. Three factors are relevant. First, power dispersion was a
basic, articulated reason for the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act. 170 Therefore, the claim
that power dispersion should inform the merger law is strong. Second,
application of the merger law does not create power dispersion or
atomization. It merely preserves an existing dispersion of power.
Therefore, the merger law cannot fairly be charged with destroying
existing efficiencies. Third, in merger cases, power dispersion itself
does not necessarily correlate with consumer benefit. At the extreme,
power dispersion could conflict with consumer interests. There is an
intimation in merger opinions of the 1960s and early 1970s that
mergers might appropriately be banned merely to satisfy nostalgic
yearnings for a society of many small units, even if consumers suffer a
loss.' 7 '
Under the proposal offered here, the power dispersion goal would
continue to inform merger policy in ways that do not threaten harm to
the consumer over the long run. In substantial horizontal merger
cases such as United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 172 the power
dispersion goal should bolster significantly the economic presumption
that creation or increase of oligopoly power is harmful to consumers.
Even when market shares of merging firms are less substantial than in
Philadelphia National Bank, the power dispersion goal should support
the weaker economic inference that a trend toward market power is
potentially harmful to consumers. 73
In merger cases, the value against centralized power should be
credited in its own right. If, however, a merger promises productive
efficiencies to firms in a fragmented market not threatened with the
creation of market power, and market forces are likely to cause the
cost savings to be passed on to the consumer, it would be unwise to
use a power-dispersion goal to justify invalidation of the merger, and
169 The author has addressed the subject elsewhere, using a framework in which consumer
and other values are compatible. Fox, supra note 166.
170 See notes 54-60 and accompanying text supra.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966) (Stewart J.,
dissenting).
17 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
173 See Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979). See also Bok,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).
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it would be perverse to use the achievement of cost savings as the
reason for invalidation. 74
2. Entrepreneurial Opportunity and Consumer Interests
Like power dispersion, entrepreneurial opportunity informs in-
terpretations of the Sherman and the Clayton Acts, and would con-
tinue to do so under my proposal. The Sherman Act prohibition
against concerted boycotts of single victims and the prohibition
against certain tie-ins are illustrative.
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 175 Klor's, the operator
of a retail store, was a victim of a concerted refusal to sell electrical
appliances. Hundreds of other retail stores in the vicinity offered the
merchandise of the boycotting manufacturers. Thus, the elimination
of Kor's as a retailer of those goods did not perceptibly affect con-
sumer choice or the vigor of competition in electrical appliances. The
district court dismissed the case, and the court of appeals affirmed on
the ground that the boycott had caused no public injury. 7 ' The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the injury to Kor's alone was
sufficient to sustain the violation. The boycott deprived Kor's of a
fair opportunity to compete on the merits. The principle protecting
" In Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Supreme Court held
illegal the acquisition by Brown Shoe Company, a manufacturer and retailer of shoes, of G.R.
Kinney Company, also a manufacturer and retailer of shoes, on grounds of both horizontal and
vertical effects. The market shares involved were small. Brown Shoe manufactured 4% of all of
the nation's shoes, and Kinney manufactured 0.5% of all of the nation's shoes. In a great
many cities in which the two firms competed at the retail level, their combined market share
was less than 5 %, although in a handful of cities their combined share of retail shoe sales was
quite high. The Court considered, among other things, that the combined firm was now a large
chain, and "the large chains can set and alter styles in footwear to an extent that renders the
independents unable to maintain competitive inventories." Id. at 344. Further, the Court said:
"The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers and by increasing the
volume of purchases from the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own
brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers." Id.
In an article criticizing the Court's resolution of the efficiency issue in Brown Shoe,
Professors Blake andJones observe that the government had argued that the combination "was
a menace to competition because the integrated company would have been more efficient."
Brown's counsel "found himself in the incomprehensible position of arguing that the merger
produced no such economies or likelihood of benefit to the consumer." The Court "agreed
with the Government both on the facts and on the law: that the merger would result in
improved efficiency and that this improvement supported its finding that the merger was
unlawful." Blake &Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 422,
456-57 (1965) (footnotes omitted). Brown Shoe is thus a classic case for protection of competitors,
despite language in the case to the contrary.
1- 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
178 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958).
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Klor's opportunity to compete coincides with the principle of keeping
markets free and open, and does not threaten harm to consumers.
Therefore, it would be preserved under the proposal.
The tie-in case law also protects fair opportunity to compete on
the merits, and much of the law is not based upon harm to consumers'
interests. International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States177 is an example.
International Salt made patented salt machines and required that its
lessees buy from it the salt to be used in the machines. If, however, a
competitor offered salt at lower than the contract price, International
Salt's customer had the right to buy the salt from the competitor or to
pay the lower price to International Salt. The tied salt represented a
substantial dollar volume of business, although apparently not a sig-
nificant percentage of the salt market. On these facts, the tie was held
illegal. The Court protected the right of competing salt sellers to an
equal chance to compete on the merits. "[I]t is unreasonable, per se, "
said the Court, "to foreclose competitors from any substantial market
[by use of leverage]." 178
In International Salt, unlike Klor's, possible efficiency claims may
be asserted. 179  Some economists argue that tying may be conducive
to efficiency in the market of the tying product and should be allowed
unless it provably harms competition (e.g., by restricting output) in
the market for the tied product. 80 When a firm with market power
over a tying product forces a tie, however, the efficiency claims in
support of tying are not obviously more weighty than the efficiency
claims against tying. 181 Although economics provide no clear answer,
traditional antitrust values that protect access to markets on the basis
of merits, not leverage, are exceedingly strong. Therefore, the pro-
posal would preserve the prohibition against unjustified tying by firms
177 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
178 Id.at 396.
179 Tying can result in realization of distribution economies through sales of related goods to
the same customers. Also, a seller may employ tying as a device to maximize revenues by
charging a higher price to the more intense users. In addition, tying can aid the seller in
extracting the maximum return from buyers of complementary products. See F. SCHERER supra
note 46. Tying also can facilitate entry and protect the quality of the tying product; however, if
it is necessary to accomplish either, tying is justified and not illegal. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); United States v.
Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
180 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 171-84; Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
181 See Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33
VAND. L. REv. 283 (1980). See also the analysis ofJustice White, joined by justice Harlan, in
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 510 (1969) (dissenting on
the ground that the plaintiff should have been required to prove market power over the tying
product).
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with market power over the tying product, 18 2 unless the case is made
that applications of the rule deprive consumers of a lower price, better
quality, or a new alternative.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust law and policy is at the heart of a storm of criticism
leveled against government regulation. Detractors' major claim is that
antitrust impairs efficiency and harms consumers. Critics would dras-
tically curtail the scope of the law by eliminating the non-efficiency
values and by limiting the efficiency goals of antitrust.
I have attempted to demonstrate that there are many ways of
conceiving of efficiency and of an antitrust system most likely to
produce it, that the central non-efficiency values of the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts are compatible with their efficiency goals, and
that the Sherman and Clayton Acts can and should be modernized to
meet the major criticism by changes at the margin to assure protection
of the interests of consumers.
My proposal contains three parts. First, I would take the current
state of the law as given and assume the correctness of the outcomes of
all of the antitrust decisions of the Burger Court insofar as they bear
on proscribed effect on competition.1 8 3
182 Certain tying is justified and not a violation of law. See note 179 supra. In other words,
there is not an absolute per se rule against tying, but a modified per se rule. This state of the
law allows for flexibility in business transactions. Should a firm desire to use a tying strategy in
circumstances that promise apparent benefits to consumers with no apparent harm, and the
firm has no less restrictive alternative available, the law is flexible enough to recognize the tie as
justified.
1M3 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974).
The outcomes of the Burger Court cases are acceptable and indeed would be indicated by
the proposal. In the Sylvania case, the Supreme Court decided that a manufacturer is not barred
by a per se rule from deciding where its distributors should be located. This decision clearly
was correct and would be indicated by the proposal. A rule of law that disables manufacturers,
particularly manufacturers without market power, from adopting an orderly distribution of
their own products, holds great potential for harm to consumers. Therefore, it is inappropriate
to bar such restraints without inquiry into their effect on competition.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. involved a similar question: namely, whether the chal-
lenged conduct was properly characterized as illegal per se. In Broadcast Music, each of the two
defendants served as nonexclusive licensing agents for millions of musical compositions. Thus,
they served as intermediaries between the tens of thousands of individual composers, and the
television and radio stations and networks that wished to use their works. Each defendant
offered blanket licenses which gave the licensee the right to perform any and all of the
compositions in the defendants' library, as often as the licensee wished, for a stated term. CBS,
1190
MODERNIZATION OF ANTITRUST
Second, the following principles should apply: (1) Antitrust law
and policy should, as its central mission, seek to preserve and promote
the competition process. (2) Within the constraints of the antitrust
statutes and stare decisis, where consumer interests and other anti-
trust goals coincide, economics should be used as a tool to protect the
functioning of markets and to advance consumers' interests, and
efficiency so conceived should be a major guide to antitrust policy. (3)
Where established antitrust principles and rights exist apart from
consumer interests, the courts should respect stare decisis, except, (4)
efficiency should serve as a limiting principle, in the sense that anti-
trust law should never be applied in a manner that threatens to hurt
consumers over the long run.
Finally, the consumer/efficiency goals of antitrust should be re-
fined. In theory, dominant weight might be accorded to all cost
savings, including those claimed to be forthcoming by leading firms in
concentrated markets; credence might be given to the view that busi-
ness is profit-maximizing and will make cost-saving decisions if left
free from government interference; and focus might be placed on
output-restriction as the central or only economic concern. On the
other hand, special value might be given to the pressures from the
forces of competition, and to dynamic efficiencies likely to be gained
from open markets with lower barriers to entry and greater economic
incentives for firms without market power.
a licensee, objected to the blanket licensing as per se illegal price-fixing. The Supreme Court
properly held that the challenged act-blanket licensing-should not be characterized as per
se illegal and thus absolutely banned without inquiry into the effect on the market. Each of the
two defendants provided a substantial service to consumers; they made a market in thousands
of compositions that could not otherwise reach users at reasonable cost. Application of the per
se rule clearly threatened consumer interests.
The General Dynamics case involved an acquisition of coal companies, one of which, United
Electric, faced depleting, unrecoverable reserves. The district court dismissed after trial,
holding that the United States had not proved its case. The only market share data the
government had introduced was data indicating past market shares, and under the unique
factual circumstances, the past success of United Electric was not useful as a proxy for future
market position. The Supreme Court affirmed. The decision is clearly defensible. A plaintiff
should be put to the proof of its case. General Dynamics signals that the less demanding approach
taken by the Warren Court is no longer acceptable. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
In all three cases, some of the language is overbroad. Language in the cases could suggest
a significant retrenchment in antitrust policy, and could indicate a new focus on restraints on
output. Other recent Supreme Court cases, however, do not support this narrow reorientation
of antitrust doctrine. A dynamic and fluid approach is indicated by the majority opinion in
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See Catalano, Inc.
v. Target Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643 (1980). See generally Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust
Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemption, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27
U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 265, 322-36 (1979).
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The first preference corresponds generally with resistance to anti-
trust and is used in defense of concentration and market power. The
second preference corresponds generally with the historical goals of
antitrust and is used in defense-of the competition process. Proponents
of both perspectives claim to protect the consumer interest. Where the
choice must be made, the second conception should be preferred
because it is harmonious with, rather than hostile to, the fabric of
antitrust. 18
4
In sum, antitrust should be modernized. The law should be
responsive to societal needs for enhanced efficiency, in the interest of
consumers. At the same time, antitrust should and can retain compat-
ibility with its multivalued, flexible charter, tested by more than
ninety years of history, and still the richest framework for progressive,
pluralistic free enterprise.
184 The choice of a definition of efficiency may be crucial to the outcome of litigation, and
vacillation between the poles is bound to produce uncertainty and inefficient antitrust enforce-
ment. The role of normative judgments when economic answers are not clear is captured in a
statement by Professor Gellhorn in his review of The Antiirust Paradox:
What should the enforcement official or judge do, for example, where the evidence
is unclear whether the price discrimination injures consumer welfare, where empir-
ical data do not demonstrate that a merger will or will not increase efficiency, or
when continuation of a monopoly threatens innovation or productive efficiency?
What legal presumptions (which lawyers know are likely to be decisive) should be
applied, and who should bear the burden of proof?
Gellhorn, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. Rav. 1376, 1384 (1979) (reviewing R. BORK, THF
ANTITRUST PARADOX).
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